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Abstract 
Police agencies assume a significant role in the creation and enforcement of government 
counter-terrorism strategies. Modern police organizations are tasked with preventing and 
responding to terrorism, in addition to their traditional policing duties of crime prevention, criminal 
investigation and order maintenance.  However, despite the increment and spending on police 
counter-terrorism efforts, very little is known about the exact nature and effectiveness of police 
counter-terrorism strategies. Studying the policing of terrorism for a detailed understanding of 
what police are doing regarding counter-terrorism is a major requisite for terrorism researchers. 
Additionally, explaining why police agencies differ in their responses to terrorism is also critical 
in analyzing police counter-terrorism tactics. Although there exist studies that compare and 
contrast countries’ responses, there is not much comparative research on police organizations’ 
responses to terrorism. The current research develops a comparative analysis of the Turkish and 
Canadian police organizations’ responses to terrorism. Using data obtained on the Turkish 
National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the main purpose of the 
current study is to explore and compare how international police organizations respond to 
terrorism. This thesis aims to advance the knowledge and practice of the police role in countering 
terrorism. 
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Terrorism continues to represent a complex threat for national and global security. Various 
sub-state groups and nations have employed terrorism in the post-World War II era since modern 
terrorism is an “inexpensive, attractive and effective instrument for achieving political, social, 
economic and strategic objectives in violation of law” (Alexander, 2009, p. 4). Recent 
developments in communication, technology, means of transportation, conventional and 
unconventional weaponry have caused modern terrorists to employ terrorist propaganda and 
violence on an unprecedented scale. This has implications in terms of serious threats to global 
peace and security. Terrorism has therefore become a significant public policy issue within the 
past few decades and especially since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United 
States. After the devastating attacks of 9/11, the world focused more attention on terrorism; 
however, terrorism was not invented on 9/11 (Roach, 2011). Terrorism was an issue long before 
9/11 for countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Peru and Turkey, all of who have suffered 
from terrorist activities since 1970s (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006).  
As a result of large scale global terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, and the 
announcement of the ‘war on terror’, terrorism is regarded as one of the most serious problems 
confronting modern societies.  The need for efficient counter-terrorism policies has become an 
issue of paramount political and social concern (Pickering, McCulloch & Wright-Neville, 2008). 
Governments all around the world are now confronted with the problem of how to effectively 
respond to terrorism and the changed terrorist threat. This problem has been made more 
complicated by the lack of international consensus regarding a universally agreed upon definition 
of terrorism, and indeed has provoked extensive debate (Hanniman, 2007). The failure of the 
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United Nations (UN) to agree on a definition of terrorism has had a negative impact on how 
governments have responded to acts of terrorism (Roach, 2011). Defining terrorism is a problem 
which impedes a collective approach and satisfactory cooperation for combatting terrorism 
globally. 
Terrorism represents a significant threat to states around the world; however, governments 
differ in their responses to the challenges of terrorism (Jacoby, 2004; Orttung, 2006). In terms of 
counter-terrorism strategies, governments have responded in various ways such as the use of 
diplomacy and the political process (executive and legislative), the use of law enforcement 
agencies, through the criminal justice system and the employment of militarized strategies (Jacoby, 
2004). Responses of different countries to terrorism also have differed according to “their own 
particular histories and legal, political, and social cultures” (Roach, 2011, p. 1).   
Terrorism has become an important subject matter across a wide range of social institutions 
such as politics, the military, law and police and the criminal justice (Deflem, 2010). Accordingly, 
the past few decades have witnessed an increase in scholarship regarding terrorism and counter-
terrorism. However, some aspects of the field of terrorism studies have not received sufficient 
attention. As Deflem (2010, p. 1) argues, among these aspects, “the policing of terrorism presents 
an as-yet relatively unexplored and often not properly understood topic of research”.  
Police organisations assume a significant role in the creation and enforcement of government 
counter-terrorism strategies and are increasingly required to combine law enforcement with tasks 
and responsibilities for national defence and homeland security (Pickering et al., 2008). The police 
agencies are now tasked with preventing and responding to terrorism, in addition to their traditional 
tasks for crime prevention, criminal investigation and order maintenance. Because terrorist 
activities are considered inherently criminal behaviours under the legislation of most nations, 
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police agencies frequently play a significant role in counter-terrorist operations (Martin, 2011). 
Today, police services in all democratic countries, centralized and non-centralized, are engaged in 
a wide range of counter-terrorism activities including investigating specific cases, tracking down 
suspected terrorists, disrupting/dismantling terrorist plots, community engagement for the 
prevention of terrorism and international police cooperation in counter-terrorism cases (Bayley & 
Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010). However, despite the proliferation and spending on police 
counter-terrorism efforts, very little is known about the exact nature and effectiveness of police 
counter-terrorism strategies and tactics (Lum, Haberfeld, Fachner, & Lieberman, 2009). Clearly, 
studying the policing of terrorism for a detailed understanding of what police are doing to counter 
terrorism is a major requisite for terrorism researchers and a currently missing component of 
terrorism studies. Moreover, according to Lum et al. (2009), explaining why law enforcement 
agencies differ in their responses is also imperative in analyzing police counter-terrorism tactics. 
Although there exist a few studies that compare and contrast countries’ responses to terrorism 
(Aktan & Koknar, 2002; Alexander, 2002; Lesser, 1999; Roach, 2011), there is not much 
comparative research on police organizations’ responses to terrorism and counter-terrorism 
policies and procedures.  
This thesis is a modest attempt to fill this gap in the literature on terrorism and counter-
terrorism. The study develops a comparative analysis of the Turkish and Canadian police 
organizations’ responses to terrorism.  Two police organizations were selected for this study. The 
organizations being studied are the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP). In Turkey, the TNP is the leading agency responsible for the 
implementation of government counter-terrorism strategies and the enforcement of counter-
terrorism tasks such as the prevention and investigation of terrorist activities. In Canada, the 
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RCMP is the primary national security and counter-terrorism policing agency responsible for the 
investigation of terrorism-related offences. 
These countries were selected for a comparative analysis for a number of reasons. Turkey 
has a considerable experience in the field of counter-terrorism. Turkey’s experience in combatting 
terrorism is unique for several reasons (Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). First, Turkey has a significant 
and complex geographical location in one of the most violent, instable and turbulent regions in the 
world. There have been ongoing conflicts in neighboring countries such as Syria, Iraq and Iran, 
conflicts between Palestine and Israel, and problems in Caucasus and Balkan regions. Turkey has 
been greatly affected by these conflicts and problems in different ways. There have been increasing 
acts of terrorism in and outside the country and the emergence of new terrorist groups. Turkey has 
become an important transit point for terrorists and terrorist related activity. This has included 
other illegal activities such as human trafficking and migrant smuggling. In addition to its position 
as a transit state in a geographical and physical sense, Turkey also acts as a vital link and a cultural 
bridge between the West and the Islamic world (Ker-Lindsay, 2009).  
Second, Turkey, given its significant and complex geo-political and geo-strategic position, 
has been threatened by a wide range of terrorist groups including Marxist-Leninist (extreme 
leftist), religiously inspired (religiously exploiting) and ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorist 
organizations (Durna & Hancerli, 2007; Orttung, 2006; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Sozen, 2006; 
Turkish National Police, 2014; Yilmaz, 2011). Acts of terrorism in Turkey have claimed 
approximately 40,000 lives including civilians and security forces over the last 30 years, and most 
of these losses were because of ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism. However, Turkey also faces 
threats from Al-Qaeda linked or inspired terrorist networks and international terrorism. The car 
bombing of two synagogues and truck bombings of HSBC Bank and British Consulate in Istanbul 
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on 15-20 November 2003 were claimed by Turkish extremists linked to Al-Qaeda. These attacks 
left 62 people dead and more than 650 injured, and were in fact the deadliest terrorist incidents in 
Turkish history (Orttung, 2006). In addition to having the highest number of victims of terrorism 
within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Turkey has also suffered 
economically because of acts of terrorism (due to reduced investment and tourism) with an 
approximate cost of more than 100 billion US dollars to the country (Durna & Hancerli, 2007; 
Orttung, 2006).   
Given Turkey’s extensive counter-terrorism experience and the fact that the Turkish 
government and security forces have been fighting against such a wide variety of terrorist groups 
(which differ in their ideological motives, methods, tactics, financing activities, membership 
profiles, recruitment strategies etc.), Turkey can be considered an ideal case study. The challenge 
of terrorism that Turkey faces, and its counter-terrorism policies and strategies warrant further 
scholarly research. Moreover, Turkey is a unique example of a NATO member (a non-Western 
country) facing a wide range of terrorist threats including jihadist/religiously motivated terrorism. 
Turkey’s counter-terrorism responses including the law enforcement response, should be subject 
to comparative evaluation/analysis with current Western responses to terrorism. This research is 
an attempt of such comparative evaluation and uses Canada as the Western country as its basis for 
comparative analysis of counter-terrorism policies.  
Several reasons influenced the selection of Canada as a case in this study. Canada is familiar 
with terrorism and terrorist attacks on its soil since the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) 
terrorist campaign in 1970s. Although Canada does not have the same level of experience with 
terrorism as Turkey, it witnessed the terrorist bombing of Air India Flight 182 on June 23, 1985 
which was the deadliest act of aviation terrorism in world history before the attacks of 9/11 and 
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the worst terrorist attack in Canadian history (Public Safety Canada, 2013; Roach, 2006). Canada 
has also suffered from 9/11 terrorist attacks where twenty four Canadian citizens were killed. 
Recently, on 20 and 22 October 2014, Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic 
lone-actor terrorism1 which left two Canadian Armed Forces members dead and one wounded. 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Government of Canada have characterized both 
incidents as terrorist acts. Terrorism is, therefore, not a new issue for Canada and its citizens. Like 
Turkey, Canada has experienced acts of domestic and international terrorism. 
Terrorism still constitutes a serious and persistent threat to Canada, Canadians and Canadian 
interests abroad (Public Safety Canada, 2013). According to Public Safety Canada (2013), Canada 
faces threats from violent extremist groups at home and abroad, international terrorist groups and 
domestic issue-based extremism. Canada is being threatened by Al-Qaeda due to its position as 
the neighbour and strong ally of the US, as well as its leading role as an important actor in the fight 
against Al-Qaeda and global terrorism and its active military presence in Afghanistan (Jacoby, 
2004; Wilner, 2009). All of these factors contribute to the identification of Canada as a legitimate 
target for terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda and various other extremist groups.  
When we look at how Canada has responded to terrorism historically, we observe that the 
terrorist attacks on 9/11, as for many Western countries, have been an important landmark for 
Canada in terms of counter-terrorism and national security efforts. Canada responded to 9/11 in 
multiple ways. For example, one of Canada’s responses to 9/11 was the enactment of the Anti-
1 On October 20, 2014, Martin Couture-Rouleau deliberately rammed a car into a group of two Canadian 
Armed Forces members in a shopping centre parking lot in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. One soldier 
died and another soldier was wounded in this incident. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and 
the Government of Canada has characterized the incident as a terrorist act by an ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant)-inspired terrorist. On October 22, 2014, a series of shootings happened in Ottawa in which 
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo, a Canadian soldier on ceremonial sentry 
duty at the Canadian National War Memorial. This incident was classified by RCMP as a terrorist attack. 
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Terrorism Act (ATA), which included a broad definition of terrorism, new terrorism offences and 
extensive new anti-terrorism measures in the Canadian Criminal Code (Jacoby, 2004; Roach, 
2011). The Anti-Terrorism Act also provided Canadian law enforcement agencies with broad new 
investigative tools such as investigative hearings and preventive arrests (Hanniman, 2007). The 
Canadian government has put into effect a legislation entitled Bill C-51 (the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
2015) which expands the powers of Canadian security agencies. Taking into account the foregoing 
discussion, Canada is considered to be an appropriate case for this study. 
This thesis is a modest attempt at contributing to our understanding of the similarities and 
differences between counter-terrorism responses of law enforcement agencies, particularly 
Western and non-Western countries’ law enforcement organizations. It provides a critical and 
comparative examination of the counter-terrorism policies of Turkey and Canada. This 
comparative study aims to advance both knowledge and practice in regard to the police role in 
responding to terrorism and contribute to the efforts of countries against the global terrorist threat. 
This thesis is organized in 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research problem, research 
purposes and objectives. Chapter 2 introduces thoughts on the problem of terrorism. This chapter 
will focus on the definition and the explanations of terrorism to illustrate the concept of terrorism 
and will also attempt to give the reader background information regarding the role of police 
agencies in counter-terrorism. Chapter 3 provides a brief discussion of terrorism and counter-
terrorism activities in Turkey and Canada. Chapter 4 outlines the proposed methodology for the 
study. Chapter 5 examines critically counter-terrorism policies and response strategies of both 
countries’ national police agencies from a comparative perspective. Chapter 6 is the conclusion of 
the thesis. This chapter consists of two parts. The first section focuses on a discussion of the issues 
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that are presented in the thesis. The second section offers some policy recommendations and 















































Review of the Literature 
 
This chapter summarizes the key research literature on theories and responses to terrorism. 
In this chapter, some introductory thoughts regarding the problem of terrorism in general will be 
offered. This chapter focuses on the definition and the explanations of terrorism to illustrate the 
concept of terrorism and also attempts to give the reader information regarding the role of police 
agencies in counter-terrorism. 
Defining Terrorism 
The past few decades have witnessed an increase in the scholarship produced regarding 
terrorism. The definition of terrorism has been critical to this body of literature. According to 
Gergin, Balci and Eldivan (2009, p. 265), “terrorism is one of the most controversial terms that 
have little, if any, common consensus as to its true meaning”. There is no single, widely accepted 
or universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006; Klinger & Heal, 2011). Almost 
all definitions of terrorism include the mention of violence and the desire of those perpetrating the 
violence to influence the behaviour of those they target. However, agreement beyond these points 
of commonality is limited (Klinger & Heal, 2011). The absence of a single universally agreed-
upon definition of terrorism unavoidably weakens the description, evaluation, prevention or 
effective intervention of terrorist activities. Defining terrorism is a problem which also impedes a 
collective approach and a satisfactory cooperation for combatting terrorism globally.  
Despite the fact that terrorism has been a serious source of concern for the international 
community for decades, it is striking that the UN has not been able to provide a universally agreed-
upon definition of terrorism up to now. Sezgin (2007, p. 32) states that “this is due to international 
affairs where the majority of nation-states work by principles of realism that sway states to pursue 
10 
 
their own national interests, instead of a common one”. Such an approach by states seems to be 
explained by the fact that terrorism is fundamentally and inherently political, and inevitably about 
the pursuit, acquisition and use of power to achieve political change (Hoffman, 2006). In spite of 
the fact that 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols for counter-terrorism purposes have 
been issued by the UN up until now, “many states have not been party to these international 
instruments or do not implement them, evidently due to political reasons” (Ozguler, 2008, p. 8).  
Various definitions of terrorism have been proposed by a variety of institutions and scholars. 
There seem to be nearly as many definitions of terrorism as there are authorities studying them 
and agencies responsible for protecting the country against terrorism (Mullins & Thurman, 2011). 
Alex Schmid, in his book Political terrorism: A research guide to concepts, theories, data bases, 
and literature (1983) discovered over one hundred definitions of terrorism. Though a discussion 
of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis, some of the more prominent and widely utilized 
examples of these definitions are discussed here. For example, the academic definition of terrorism 
by the UN is: 
Any action… that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-
combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a 
population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act. (UN Office of Drugs and Crime, 2005) 
The United Nations has not been able to offer a legal versus an academic definition. 
However, the Council of the European Union has adopted a working framework (Ozguler, 2008). 
According to this framework, particular offenses are considered as terrorist acts: 
Given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international 
organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population; or unduly 
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compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from 
performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, 
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization 
(The Council of the European Union, 2002, p. 4). 
There are many different legal definitions of terrorism in addition to these transnational-level 
definitions. For example, the Turkish Anti-terrorism Act (1991), describes terrorism as: 
Any kind of criminal act done by one or more persons belonging to an organization with the 
aim of changing the characteristics of the republic as specified in the constitution, its 
political, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the 
state with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turkish State and 
republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the state, eliminating 
fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external security of the state, 
public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, 
oppression or threat. 
A remarkable point in the legal definition of terrorism by the Turkish Anti-terrorism Act is 
that the law stipulates that the act must be committed by a person or persons belonging to an 
organization. However, the law also specifies that a person who is not a member of a terrorist 
organization but commits crimes on behalf of the organization is also regarded as a terrorist 
offender. This definition points out that an individual act can be recognized as a terrorist offence 
whether the individual belongs to an organization or commits crimes on behalf of the organization 
despite not being a member of the organization.     
Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code of Canada (1985) defines terrorism as: 
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An act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, 
religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and in whole or in part with the intention 
of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including 
its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an international 
organization to do or to refrain from doing any act, whether the public or the person, 
government or organization is inside or outside Canada.  
Activities recognized as criminal within this context include death and bodily harm with the 
use of violence; endangering a person’s life; risks posed to the health and safety of the public; 
significant property damage; and interference or disruption of essential services, facilities or 
systems (Department of Justice, Canada, 2014). 
The UK Terrorism Act 2006, defines terrorism as “the use and threat of action designed to 
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public and made for the 
purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause” (Ozguler, 2008, p. 13). Similar to 
the legal definition of terrorism in the Criminal Code of Canada, the Act includes violence against 
people; significant property damage; putting into danger a person’s life, risks to the health or safety 
of the public and  serious interference or disruption of essential services, facilities or systems are 
the fundamental actions addressed within the scope of the Act. The UK Terrorism Act 2006 also 
introduced a number of new offenses which are classified as “Acts Preparatory to Terrorism”, 
“Encouragement to Terrorism”, “Dissemination of Terrorist Publications”, and “Terrorist training 
offences” (Ozguler, 2008). 
There are also many different definitions of terrorism developed by academic scholars. Forst 
(2009, p. 5) defines terrorism as “the premediated and unlawful use or threatened use of violence 
against a non-combatant population or target having symbolic significance, with the aim of either 
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inducing political or religious change through intimidation and destabilization or destroying a 
population identified as an enemy”. Black (2004, p. 10) defines terrorism in its purest form as 
“unilateral self-help by organized civilians who covertly inflict mass violence on other civilians”. 
Black (2004, p. 9) also sees pure terrorism as a “distinctive form of social control partly akin to 
warfare that arises with a particular social geometry”. Hoffman (2006, p. 2-3) defines terrorism as 
“violence -or, equally important, the threat of violence– used and directed in pursuit of, or in 
service of, a political aim’. According to Agnew (2010), terrorism is defined as the commission of 
criminal acts, usually violent, that target civilians or violate conventions of war when targeting 
military personnel, and that are committed at least partly for social, political, or religious ends.  
Different governmental agencies also have developed their own definitions of terrorism. In 
some cases, however, different departments or agencies inside the same government have different 
definitions of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006; Mullins & Thurman, 2011).  The United States 
Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use –or threatened use of- force or 
violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to 
achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives” (Mullins & Thurman, 2011, p. 42). The 1986 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or 
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, 
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Mullins & Thurman, 2011, 
p. 43). The Department of Homeland Security defines terrorism as any activity that is dangerous 
to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and … must also 
appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping (Hoffman, 2006, p. 31). Each of these institutional 
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definitions of terrorism reflects the priorities and specific interests of their respective agencies 
(Hoffman, 2006).   
Kastanidou (2004, p. 18) argues that, “terrorism is a phenomenon pertaining to social and 
political life, and its definition within the framework of criminal law cannot be disassociated from 
its social and political milieu”. For this reason, each legal definition of terrorism as a crime should 
also “reflect the opinion of the political and social culture to which it belongs” (Sezgin, 2007, p. 
33). This basically means that a consensus among the various components of the society and 
different governmental agencies is required for the enactment of even a national definition of 
terrorism. Therefore, it may be extremely difficult to achieve a unanimously agreed upon 
declarative definition of terrorism at the global level by states.  
There are also several other reasons which complicate the establishment of a universally 
agreed upon definition of terrorism. First, the term terrorism is fundamentally and inherently 
political which sometimes render the cooperation between states impossible (Hoffman, 2006). As 
the concept of terrorism is usually subject to political evaluations, for example, an entity’s freedom 
fighter for today may become the same entity’s terrorist tomorrow (Sezgin, 2007). Similarly, 
today’s terrorist can easily be labeled peacemaker tomorrow depending on the variable political 
factors at work.  
A second point which complicates our ability to define terrorism is the changing nature of 
terrorism over time (Mullins & Thurman, 2011). There have been significant shifts in terrorist 
organizations and terrorist activities over the past two hundred years. For example, the word 
“terrorism” first became popular during the French Revolution and had a clearly positive 
implication at that time unlike its modern usage because it was used as a means to establish order 
during the anarchical period following the revolution (Hoffmann, 2006). In the following decades, 
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the usage of the term terrorism has been expanded to include a variety of interpretations (Sezgin, 
2007). While terrorism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was predominantly associated 
with the activities of anarchists and social revolutionaries, Marxist/Leninist groups were active in 
1960s and 1970s when nationalist and ethnic separatist groups –such as the Quebecois separatist 
group FLQ, the Basque ETA (Euskadita Askatasuna, or Freedom for the Basque Homeland), and 
Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK-Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) also started to employ terrorism for 
their purposes. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 on US soil redefined terrorism yet again (Hoffman, 
2006). Mullins and Thurman (2011) argue that terrorism has numerous manifestations which must 
be perceived in the context of time, social parameters, political elements, economic conditions and 
other social dynamics.  
The other significant obstacles for establishing a single, precise definition of terrorism are; 
a lack of consensus on the typologies of terrorism and terrorists, the relationship of the concept of 
terrorism with seemingly similar concepts, such as guerilla warfare, insurgency or freedom 
fighting. The vague nature of the term terrorism means it has been (and is) used to indicate a wide 
variety of aggressive action by human beings against others. Terrorist organizations select and 
utilize names to describe themselves which avoid the word “terrorism” (use of names such as army, 
self-defence movement, brigade, revolutionary, liberation army/front or as state with redrawn 
boundaries) to get rid of their terrorist image in public opinion and at the global level. There has 
been a change in the attitudes of states towards certain activities over time which leads to the 
relabeling of certain activities as terrorist. One such example is the US government’s designation 
of the Afghan mujahedeen as terrorists after 9/11 while previously it was supporting the 




There have also been debates on the target side of terrorism. Most definitions of terrorism 
regard “innocents” or “non-combatants” as the targets of terrorism. However, as in the example of 
the PKK, terrorists can also target combatants (active military units), therefore, a definition 
excluding “combatants” as target may not be agreed on by a state that is dealing with separatist 
terrorism and trying to suppress it by the use of military force (Forst, 2011; Hoffman, 2006; Klinger 
& Heal, 2011; Mullins & Thurman, 2011; Ozguler, 2008; Sezgin, 2007). 
 Although there is a comprehensive list of definitions offered by different sources and these 
definitions may differ from each other, there are some common elements included in these 
definitions of terrorism. According to Schmid (2013a), the most common dimensions included in 
1092 different definitions of terrorism are the use of violence or force (83.5 percent of the 
definitions), political aims (65 percent), emphasize of fear or terror (51 percent), the threat of 
violence (47 percent), psychological effects and anticipated reactions (41.5 percent), victim-target 
differentiation (37.5 percent) and the act being purposive, planned, systematic and organized (32 









2 This list is not exhaustive in part because many new definitions may have been added since 1984 and 
particularly since 9/11. 
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Elements Frequency  (%) 
1 Violence, force 83.5 
2 Political 65 
3 Fear, terror emphasized 51 
4 Threat 47 
5 (Psychological) effects and (anticipated) reactions 41.5 
6 Victim-target differentiation 37.5 
7 Purposive, planned, systematic, organized action 32 
8 Method of combat, strategy, tactic 30.5 
9 Extranormality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints 30 
10 Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance 28 
11 Publicity aspect 21.5 
12 Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination 21 
13 Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims 17.5 
14 Intimidation 17 
15 Innocence of victims emphasized 15.5 
16 Group, movement, organization as perpetrator 14 
17 Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others 13.5 
18 Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence 9 
19 Clandestine, covert nature 9 
20 Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence 7 
21 Criminal 6 
22 Demands made on third parties 4 
Table 1. The most common dimensions included in 109 definitions of terrorism (Schmid, 2013a) 
Hoffman (2006) states that terrorism is inevitably political in aims and motives, violent or 
threatens violence, intended to have widespread psychological influences beyond the immediate 
victim or target, conducted by either an organization or individuals or a small collection of 
individuals inspired by existing terrorist movements and committed by a subnational group or non-
state entity. Mullins and Thurman (2011, p. 45) argue that a few common threads emerge from the 
examination of the listed definitions, however, “these tendencies are far from universal”. They 
further note that violence is a tool employed by terrorists but not a goal of terrorism. Terrorism 
implicates violence or threatened violence, terrorism is political, instigating fear in the audience is 
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the goal of terrorism and violence is aimed at those who might be watching (Mullins & Thurman, 
2011). 
As it is apparent from the abovementioned explanations, some definitions of terrorism focus 
on perpetrators, others focus on targets or goals of the attackers, yet others focus on victims and 
still others on the techniques of the attacks. With the usage of certain definitions, many acts of 
terrorism can be excluded or many non-terrorist acts can be included. For example, when attacks 
against combatants rather than civilians are not regarded as terrorist acts pursuant to some 
definitions of terrorism, PKK’s terrorist actions against Turkish military targets or the bombing of 
the USS Cole destroyer by Al-Qaeda while harbored in Yemen in 2000 can be omitted from the 
definition of terrorism. However, these two examples are clearly and undoubtedly terrorist actions 
conducted by PKK which is listed by the US and the European Union as a terrorist organisation 
and Al-Qaeda which is responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  Gergin et al. (2009) argue that 
the exclusion of attacks towards military or police officer combatants from the definition of 
terrorism could lead to the possibility that some terrorists can be considered as freedom fighters 
and some countries might avoid cooperating with others in the struggle against terrorist 
organisations or even support them. In sum, defining terrorism remains a very controversial and 
political issue and the identification of the common elements in the definitions of terrorism, also, 
does not get us any closer to answering the question of what terrorism is or is not. 
The absence of definitional clarity about terrorism presents significant challenges for 
government officials who are tasked with preventing and responding to terrorist acts and for 
scholars who are involved in terrorism research. In terms of academic studies, the lack of a clear 
definition of terrorism complicates clearly defining which types of actions comprise the subject 
matter that the scholars would like to study.  This in turn prevents the emergence of a compelling 
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body of terrorism scholarship (Klinger & Heal, 2011). The absence of an adequate body of 
literature in terrorism studies will hinder our further understanding of terrorism and terrorists. 
Much of the scholarly work on terrorism has been produced by political scientists and our 
knowledge of terrorism has generally remained limited to political and religious explanations 
(Forst, Greene, & Lynch, 2011). In terms of public policy, the absence of a clear terrorism 
definition creates ramifications for societies dealing with terrorism to develop means for 
preventing terrorism and responding to terrorist attacks which already happened (Klinger & Heal, 
2011).  
Explanations of Terrorism 
Terrorism is a complex phenomenon with different forms, dimensions and manifestations 
(Ozguler, 2008; McAllister & Schmid, 2013). As a result of this complex nature, terrorism has 
been studied by scholars in a multidisciplinary perspective. This multidisciplinary approach to 
terrorism has resulted in theories of terrorism coming from a variety of backgrounds such as 
political science, international relations, psychology, sociology, economics, criminology and 
criminal justice, history, military science, law, ethnic and religious studies and conflict resolution 
studies (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). Although there exists no general theory of terrorism due to 
a lack of consensus on a common definition of terrorism and the diversity of the phenomenon 
(McAllister & Schmid, 2013), terrorism theories can be classified into five categories depending 
on their point of interest: 
• Psychological theories; 
• Radicalization theories; 
• Structural theories; 
• Organizational (institutional) theories; 
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• Strategic (rational choice) theories. 
Psychological theories focus on individual factors for the explanation of participation in 
terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1981; Horgan, 2003; Silke, 2003). Theories of radicalization 
focus on the processes through which individuals become socialized into engaging in political 
violence without moral restraints (Moghadam, 2005; Silbner & Bhatt, 2007; Sprinzak, 1991). 
Structural theories, on the other hand, investigates the systemic causes of terrorist violence such 
as economic, political and cultural factors (Callaway & Harrelson-Stephens, 2006; Crenshaw, 
1981; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Ross, 1993). Organizational theories of terrorism focus on the 
effects of organizations on individual behaviour and “picture terrorism resulting from internal 
dynamics of political organizations” (McAllister & Schmid, 2013; Yilmaz, 2009, p. 36). Finally, 
strategic (rational) choice theories assume that terrorist acts are the result of terrorists’ rational 
calculation of the costs and benefits of their actions (Crenshaw, 1988; Pape, 2003). In the 
following, I will briefly outline major works in the abovementioned theoretical approaches to the 
phenomenon of terrorism.  
Psychological theories of terrorism. The psychological explanations of terrorism 
basically attempt to answer the question of whether or not there is a terrorist personality. Existing 
psychological research on terrorism generally focuses on why individuals participate in terrorist 
organizations? Why they exit such organizations? and what the influences of membership in a 
terrorist organization are on the individual members? (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). However, 
while trying to find the personal factors which make an individual likely to join a terrorist 
organization, psychological theories of terrorism suffer from some deficiencies because they are 
based on “theoretical speculation or merely anecdotal empirical evidence” (McAllister & Schmid, 
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2013, p. 214). Following are some prominent examples of the research on psychological causes of 
terrorism.  
Crenshaw (1981), emphasizing the complex nature of personality-politics relationship, 
points out the invalidity of a single motivation or personality in explaining all circumstances of 
terrorism. Instead, she argues that terrorists are normal individuals and she rejects the idea of a 
psychological predisposition to terrorism which may be recognized in advance. Crenshaw (1981) 
argues that because terrorists have a high level of commitment to group purposes, it will be more 
appropriate to investigate the psychological mechanisms of group interaction rather than the 
psychological predispositions of individual terrorist group members. According to Crenshaw 
(1981), rather than being a response to an inner call, terrorism results from a progressive 
development of commitment and opposition which moreover depends on government action.  
Horgan (2003) categorizes the application of psychology to studies of terrorism as dealing 
with individual psychology and the other dealing with how individuals are influenced by 
organizational membership. He rejects the idea that terrorists possess abnormal psychological 
traits and detailed studies on this issue in fact show that most terrorists are normal individuals in a 
clinical sense (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). Horgan (2003), by comparing the terrorist violence 
and the apolitical violence of psychopaths, demonstrates that the individual patterns of a 
professional terrorist’s life do not promote abnormal personalities. Horgan (2003) states that 
pursuing collective goals and displaying extreme fidelity and dedication which are some common 
characteristics of terrorist organization members do not fit well with individuals having abnormal 
psychological attributes. Additionally, terrorist organizations will abstain from recruiting such 
individuals with extreme personalities due to security reasons. In addition to examining why 
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individuals join terrorist organizations, Horgan (2003) also focused on individuals’ remaining in 
the terrorist organizations and the process of leaving terrorist organizations.  
Silke (2003) emphasizes the importance of first-hand psychological research, such as 
conducting personal interviews with individual terrorists, because studies which claim to provide 
evidence for abnormal personality traits of terrorists generally come from researchers employing 
only secondary sources of data. He argues that terrorist organization membership is the 
consequence of particular processes which share common factors and can be modelled by 
psychologists. According to Silke (2003), many terrorists have a tendency for identifying with 
groups where the individuals experience some kind of marginalization. Silke (2003) also argues 
that the process of individual radicalization might be related to factors such as a feeling of injustice, 
a desire for personal status and awards, and a need for protection.  
Radicalization theories of terrorism. Researchers who study terrorism often focus on the 
phenomenon of how individuals become violent radicals? McAllister and Schmid (2013, p. 217) 
define radicalization as “a process of ideological socialization of (usually) young people towards 
effectuating fundamental political changes, usually through the use of violent tactics of conflict 
waging against the political enemies and their followers”. Some radicalization studies focus on the 
personal abnormalities whereas others center upon the external (structural or institutional) 
conditions influencing the transformation of normal individuals to fanatical terrorists.  
Moghadam (2005) explains the process of radicalization with a step model that elaborates 
six phases of violent radicalization. In this work, Moghadam (2005) utilizes an example of a six-
storey building in which each floor represents a phase of the radicalization process. On the ground 
floor, individuals develop a sense of injustice based on their cognitive analysis of the structural 
circumstances and feel relatively deprived. On the first floor, these individuals try to find solutions 
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to these unjust conditions and “explore various options to improving material or political 
circumstances” (McAllister & Schmid, 2013, p. 219). On the second floor, individuals begin to 
accuse other groups for injustice and displace their aggression onto them. On the third floor, they 
begin to engage with terrorist organizations and rationalize the use of violence and terrorism as a 
justified strategy for the solution. Individuals are ready to join the terrorist organization and adopt 
its values in the fourth floor. In the fifth floor, individuals are actively trained, equipped and 
allowed to engage in terrorist activities. In the sixth floor, individuals get involved in terrorist 
actions. 
Another study on the process of individual radicalization was conducted by Silbner and 
Bhatt (2007).  McAllister and Schmid (2013) argue that Silbner and Bhatt’s (2007) more grounded 
theory of radicalization is advantageous to empirical observations when compared to the study of 
Moghadam. In their study, Silbner and Bhatt (2007) contemplated four steps in the radicalization 
process:  
1. Pre-radicalization (the normal and ordinary life of individuals), 
2. Self-identification (the stage where individuals are first engaged with extremist views 
and radical beliefs by the influence of both internal and external factors, keep company 
with the individuals having the same kind of radical views and adopt this ideology as their 
own),  
3. Indoctrination (intensive reinforcement and complete assimilation of radical ideology 
by the influence of peer groups), and 
4. Jihadization (Accepting oneself as holy warrior or mujahedeen and planning and 
accomplishment of the terrorist act).  
24 
 
Silbner and Bhatt (2007), concluded that there is no instrumental psychological profile that 
will help predict who will follow the whole pathway to radicalization. However, they observed a 
significant consistency in the behaviours and direction of each of the plots across all the phases 
despite differences in circumstances and environment in each of the cases. Such a consistency 
might offer a possible tool for prediction (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). 
Structural theories of terrorism. A strong and diverse field of study has been developed 
around the investigation of structural (systemic) causes of terrorism (McAllister & Schmid, 2013). 
The structural causes of terrorism can be classified as political, economic and cultural.  
In her study regarding the causes of terrorism, Crenshaw (1981, p. 379) argues that the 
study of terrorism can be framed around three questions: “why terrorism occurs? how the process 
of terrorism works? and what its social and political effects are?”. By identifying terrorism as a 
form of political behaviour depending on deliberate choices of rational actors (including terrorist 
organizations), Crenshaw (1981) argues that an extensive analysis of causes and motivations for 
terrorism should also focus on structural variables and the probable influence of broad social, 
political, and economic conditions on terrorist violence. Additionally, based on the fact that not all 
individuals who experience a given situation practice terrorism, the possible psychological 
parameters which may foster or restrain individual participation in terrorist violence also need to 
be investigated (Crenshaw, 1981). In her analysis, Crenshaw (1981) classifies the factors which 
influence terrorism as preconditions and precipitants. 
 Preconditions for terrorism involve enabling or permissive factors which “provide 
opportunities for terrorism to happen, and situations that directly inspire and motivate terrorist 
campaigns” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 381). Preconditions can basically be assumed as the situations 
which facilitate the creation and growth of terrorism. These conditions create an environment 
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where terrorism is possible. According to Crenshaw (1981), permissive causes for terrorism are: 
modernization, urbanization, social facilitation, broad attitudes and beliefs which condone 
terrorism and a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism. On the other hand, 
precipitants can be considered as the reasons or direct causes of terrorism. These circumstances 
are basically the “background conditions that positively encourage resistance to the state” and 
“provide motivation and direction for the terrorist movement” (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383). Crenshaw 
(1981) notes that concrete dissatisfaction among an ethnic minority subjected to discrimination by 
the majority, the lack of opportunity for political expression and participation, mass passivity and 
elite dissatisfaction and precipitating events such as government use of unexpected and extreme 
force against peaceful protest or reform attempts might be considered as direct causes of terrorism. 
Ross (1993) identified three categories of theories which can explain the most prominent 
causes of oppositional political terrorism: structural, psychological and rational choice theories. 
Structural theories assume that “the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the 
political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies” (Ross, 1993, p. 317). According to 
Ross (1993), structural variables of terrorism are much easier to operationalize and measure 
compared to psychological and rational choice ones, therefore, a causal model employing 
structural variables would define clearly the dominant processes by which terrorism takes place. 
Additionally, such a kind of causal model with more specific variables might have an advantage 
of better predictive ability.  In his general causal model in which structural variables of terrorism 
were integrated, structural causes of terrorism were specified by Ross (1993) as the following: 
1. Permissive causes: 
• Geographical location (Urban vs rural areas) 
• Type of political system  
26 
 
• Level of modernization 
2. Precipitant causes: 
• Social, cultural, and historical facilitation 
• Organizational development or split 
• Presence of other forms of political unrest 
• Support 
• Counterterrorist organization failure 
• Availability of weapons and explosives 
• Grievances 
Ross (1993) argues that these structural factors interact with each other to cause terrorism. 
He further states that the general structural causal model of the conditions of terrorism that he 
proposed might be a better foundation for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the causes of 
terrorism.  
In their study investigating the relationship between human rights conditions and terrorist 
activities, Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006, p. 773) suggest a theoretical framework for 
understanding and explaining the generation and advancement of terrorism within a state and argue 
that “states which deny subsistence rights along with civil and political rights create an 
environment that is conducive to the development of terrorism”. However, according to Callaway 
and Harrelson-Stephens (2006) the state violation of security rights is a necessary condition for 
the genesis and growth of terrorism. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2006), in their 
investigation of the causes of terrorism in Northern Ireland, found that restrictions on the political 
and civil rights of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland played an important role in the creation 
of terrorism and more significantly, violations of security rights of individuals increased the 
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number of Irish people who supported and got involved in terrorist activity. In sum, the writers 
argue that the violations of human security rights are directly connected to the generation and 
expansion of terrorism in a state and policies produced to alleviate terrorism necessitate addressing 
these rights.  
Among the structural theories of terrorism, there are also economic theories of terrorism 
which attempt to link terrorism with “economic underperformance, or marginalization” 
(McAllister & Schmid, 2013, p. 249). Ted R. Gurr is a pioneering theorist who proposed a 
systematic analysis of the connection between political violence and economic marginalization 
(McAllister & Schmid, 2013). In the context of his relative deprivation theory, rather than 
demonstrating a direct relationship between political violence and economic deprivation, Gurr 
pictured rebellion as a result of political frustration which emanated from “the gap between the 
perception of individual entitlement, and the reality of goal attainment” (McAllister & Schmid, 
2013, p. 249). 
Krueger and Maleckova (2003), tested the relationship between poverty at the individual 
level and the probability of participation in Lebanon’s Hezbollah among the population of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. They found no support for the link between poverty and the 
participation in a terrorist organization. They noted that, compared with the relevant population, 
members of Hezbollah's militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come 
from economically advantaged families. Krueger and Maleckova (2003, p. 119) argue that “any 
connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite 
weak”. The writers also argue that rather than viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market 
opportunities or ignorance, it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and 
long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics.  
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Organizational (institutional) theories of terrorism. Underground organizations and the 
environments in which they operate have been subject to a significant amount of research. 
According to McAllister and Schmid (2013, p. 226), “organizational-level analysis allows the 
researcher to concentrate on issues of central concern to the discourse such as how institutions 
frame goals, mobilize resources, articulate strategies, recruit and maintain members? and (from a 
counter-terrorism perspective) what factors initiate institutional decline?”. One of the major 
theoretical approaches to studying terrorist organizations is Martha Crenshaw’s (1988) work on 
organizational process theory (OPT). Crenshaw (1988) proposed an organizational (institutional) 
theory of terrorism which focuses on the internal politics of the organization. Organizational 
process theory suggests that the primary objective of any political organization is to maintain its 
existence regardless of achieving political goals. Crenshaw (1988, p. 19) argues that “terrorist 
behaviour represents the outcome of the internal dynamics of the organization rather than strategic 
action”. As the survival of the terrorist group is the primary objective, recruitment of new members 
and keeping the existing ones is of great importance. This theory explains the reasons for joining 
a terrorist organization not only in terms of ideological commitment but also in accordance with 
various personal motivations. For example, incentives such as a feeling of belonging to a group, 
attaining social status and reputation, seeking excitement and the possibility to obtain material 
benefits encourage people to join terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1988). Organizational 
objectives are not necessarily fixed and the explication of ideology will change according to the 
need to maintain organizational survival (Crenshaw, 1988). Leaders of terrorist organizations 
strive to maintain solidarity and cohesion amongst group members and provide incentives for 
them. Also, terrorist groups are sensitive to the expression of dissent and factionalism, therefore, 
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they try to restrict departure from and suppress dissidence within the organization to be able to 
maintain group survival.  
According to Crenshaw (1988), the key vulnerability of violent organizations is the 
inability to attract and retain (new) members rather than the inability of a group to achieve political 
goals. Therefore, counter-terrorism efforts should focus on the recruitment and retention rates of 
terrorist organizations. Encouragement of fragmentation within the terrorist groups, proposing new 
and non-violent incentives, offering opportunities for exit to non-violent political methods, 
encouraging the expression of oppositional ideas among the terrorist organization, increasing the 
costs of joining a terrorist organization with strict legal penalties and offers of amnesty are some 
policy options for disrupting terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1988). 
 Rational choice (strategic) theories of terrorism. Crenshaw (1988) proposed an 
instrumental theory of terrorism which conceptualizes it as a rational choice by political actors that 
aim to produce radical changes in political and social circumstances. According to the instrumental 
model, “terrorism is one form of violent coercion, a bargaining process based on the power to hurt 
and intimidate as a substitute for the use of overt military force” (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 13). 
Terrorism is an instrument to achieve political aims and is used by non-state groups that are 
supposed to act by calculating the costs and benefits of their terrorist actions. According to this 
theory, the purpose of terrorism is to produce a change in the government's political position, not 
the destruction of military potential (Crenshaw, 1988). Instrumental theory of terrorism suggests 
that increasing the costs of terrorism and decreasing its benefits and rewards will render terrorism 
less attractive and probable.  
In terms of combatting terrorism, this model proposes two basic options for governments: 
defense and deterrence (Crenshaw, 1988). Defense option includes pre-emptive actions which aim 
30 
 
to stop the enemy who is ready to mount an imminent attack and preventive actions which intend 
to disrupt an attacker who is planning a forthcoming attack but has not yet mobilized (Crenshaw, 
1988). Deterrence strategy, on the other hand, aims to influence the adversary’s motivation for 
terrorist action by convincing him that the costs of the planned action exceed the benefits he might 
get. Deterrence strategy involves measures such as denial of the gain to the adversary, punishment 
or retaliation (Crenshaw, 1988). These responses are designed in order to decrease the reward and 
increase the cost of terrorism.  
Another study regarding the strategic choice of terrorism was conducted by Pape (2003). 
In his study which investigates the suicide terrorism specifically, Pape (2003) suggests that suicide 
terrorism has followed a strategic logic with the purpose of compelling liberal democracies to 
make remarkable territorial concessions. Pape (2003) argues that the prominence of suicide 
terrorism has not been a result of religious indoctrination or prevalence of psychological 
abnormalities which might encourage individual suicide bombers but a result of the perception of 
the terrorist groups that suicide terrorism pays. Pape (2003) emphasizes that although the 
individual suicide attackers may be irrational or psychologically abnormal, the leadership of the 
terrorist organization which recruits and directs the militants are not. Pape (2003) argues that most 
suicide terrorism is committed as a strategic tool for achieving political goals and it is not merely 
a product of irrational individuals or a fruit of religious fanaticism. Pape (2003) also demonstrates 
the timing, purposes and the intended targets of the suicide terrorist attacks between 1980 and 2001 
as the evidence of a strategic approach by terrorist groups rather than a nonstrategic response 





Responding to Terrorism  
Terrorism produces a significant threat to the security and stability of democratic nations. 
Systematic and long-term terrorism may result in the restriction of civil liberties, the violation of 
the human rights of citizens, disruption in the normal functioning of democratic institutions, 
interference with the functioning of elected representatives, and a hindrance on the development 
of civil society (Reinares, 1998). Any legitimately constituted government must therefore, respond 
to the threat of terrorism. Counter-terrorism basically refers to state policies which are aimed at 
preventing or eliminating terrorist environments and groups (Martin, 2014). From a policing 
perspective, Bayley and Weisburd (2009) describe counter-terrorism as a type of high policing 
which refers to the covert actions of intelligence collection and disruption directed against people 
considered to be terrorists. From a political perspective, according to Deflem (2010, p. 13) 
“counter-terrorism involves measures taken by the governments of national states and by 
international governing bodies”.  
Democratic states and their intelligence and law enforcement organizations may employ 
various counter-terrorism strategies and procedures, however, the ultimate goal of counter-
terrorism policies is to save lives by disrupting or decreasing the number of terrorist attacks 
(Martin, 2014). In order to achieve this goal, counter-terrorism entails the use of all convenient 
tools including intelligence, military, law enforcement, diplomatic, social and economic tools. 
Acknowledging the costs and benefits of each approach and selecting in each case the particular 
tool which is most effective under the circumstances is of utmost importance for the success of 
counter-terrorism efforts (Kris, 2011). 
The literature on terrorism offers a wide range of counter-terrorism strategies and measures 
employed by states to deal with the causes and consequences of terrorist activities (Deflem, 2010). 
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Such policy options open to police and government officials in their efforts to combat terrorism 
include but are not limited to intelligence gathering, disruption/dismantling of terrorist plots, target 
hardening against terrorist attacks, criminal investigation of terrorist incidents, community 
engagement for prevention of violent extremism, increasing public awareness to reduce sympathy 
for the terrorist cause, protection of critical infrastructure, diplomacy, negotiation and concessions, 
social and political reforms, international cooperation, international agreements, legislative efforts, 
increasing security expenditures/personnel, repression of human and civil rights, coercive and 
nonviolent covert operations, military and paramilitary suppression campaigns and international 
warfare (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Martin, 2014; Shor, 2010). These policies and 
strategies can also be classified in a number of ways such as proactive (defensive) vs. reactive 
(offensive) measures, repressive and violent measures vs. conciliatory policies, short-term vs. long 
term measures, measures directed at individuals and measures directed at a collective or groups 
(Shor, 2010). This list is not exhaustive and there are other typologies offered by the literature on 
terrorism.  
Law Enforcement as a Counter-Terrorism Tool 
Counter-terrorism is a multi-dimensional process and requires the effective use of a variety 
of tools. Military, intelligence, diplomacy, economic and social policies, and law enforcement are 
the primary instruments employed by the states for preventing and combatting terrorist activities. 
Among these instruments, law enforcement plays a vital and exclusive role as terrorism almost 
always involves a form of law breaking and all terrorism is eventually local, especially in terms of 
impacts (Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011; Friedmann & Cannon, 2007, 
Greene & Herzog, 2009). Today, terrorism is defined as a serious offence in the criminal codes of 
most nations. Correspondingly, in most parts of the world, it is the national, federal, state or local 
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police agencies that are tasked with the prevention, detection and investigation of this unique 
offence. Terrorist activities may also involve the commission of other non-violent or violent crimes 
such as drug trafficking, human smuggling, armed robbery, extortion, money laundering, homicide 
and arson. In that sense, terrorism requires more police attention than many other types of crimes. 
Accordingly, preventive efforts and investigative tools associated with crime prevention and 
detection, are also applicable to terrorism.  
On the other hand, the rarity of incidents of terrorism, and the differing nature of terrorist 
acts and its perpetrators from other types of crimes and criminals, complicate things for the police 
particularly in terms of prevention and response (Aksu, 2014). As Greene and Herzog (2009, p. 
145) state “in all likelihood, policing terrorism is different than policing crime, although the two 
occasionally overlap”. The fact that terrorists and ordinary criminals have different motivations 
and goals in perpetrating their actions (political vs. personal gain) and that terrorist attacks result 
in much more destruction and extreme fear when successful compared to common crimes, suggests 
that policing terrorism can be more challenging than policing ordinary crimes.  
Although counter-terrorism is not a new function for police agencies of countries such as 
Turkey, United Kingdom, Israel, and Spain, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the global terrorist 
threat afterwards have placed counter-terrorism as a central priority for law enforcement agencies 
of many countries across the world. Since 9/11, police services across the world have “increasingly 
examined, discussed, developed, or revised technologies, tactics, strategies, interagency 
agreements, standard operating procedures, and other policy options in an effort to prepare for, 
assess the risk of, and prevent future events of terrorism” (Lum et al., 2009, p. 101).  
From a criminological viewpoint, counter-terrorism can be examined as a matter of social 
control, including various mechanisms and institutions which define and respond to terrorism 
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(Deflem, 2010). As the primary agents of social control, police services are then actively involved 
in counter-terrorism activities. According to Deflem (2010, p. 6) “counter-terrorism-from the 
police point of view-is not a matter of war oriented at enemies but a matter of crime control 
oriented at criminal suspects approached on the basis of professional standards of policing”. This, 
in turn, facilitates a common understanding of terrorism and encourages cooperation between 
police institutions around the world. In many countries, today, law enforcement organizations are 
the leading agencies responsible for preventing and responding to terrorism. Bayley and Weisburd 
(2009), in their study examining the national structures of counter-terrorism in Western 
democracies, found that all national (centralized) police agencies engage in counter-terrorism with 
the exception of Sweden. They also found that all countries that authorize the creation of police at 
subnational, decentralized levels require them to undertake counter-terrorism operations. 
According to Bayley and Weisburd’s (2009) findings, police in all democratic countries, 
centralized and noncentralized, are authorized to engage in counter-terrorism activities. Counter-
terrorism, then, seems to impact all levels of policing (national, federal, provincial, state or local) 
to a certain extent.  
In terms of what police do for preventing and responding to terrorist acts, it can be observed 
that there are many functions carried out by law enforcement in this specialized area. For example, 
Kris (2011, p. 7) states that law enforcement “disrupts terrorist plots through arrests, incapacitates 
terrorists through incarceration after prosecution, and it can be used to obtain intelligence from 
terrorists or their supporters through interrogation, and through recruiting them as cooperating 
assets”. In answering the same question, Bayley and Weisburd (2009, p. 87) state that the police 
can be involved in “covert detection, disruption/dismantling of terrorist plots, risk analysis, target 
hardening, community mobilization for prevention, protection of important persons and 
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infrastructure, emergency assistance at terrorist incidents, order maintenance when terrorism 
occurs, mitigation of terrorist damage, and criminal investigation of terrorist incidents”.  
In their study on policing terrorism in Israel, Perliger, Hasisi, and Pedahzur (2009) argue 
that police forces are a central player in the democratic struggle against terrorism given the fact 
that both police and terrorist groups share the civilian arena as their theaters of action. According 
to Perliger et al. (2009), police services provide inherent advantages in counter-terrorism in three 
main realms: gathering intelligence on terrorist activities, thwarting of terrorist attacks through 
defensive and offensive measures, and restoration of terror sites. Police agencies are also involved 
in international cooperation against terrorism. Through bilateral and multilateral information 
sharing on suspected terrorists and through joint operations, police agencies are actively engaged 
in global counter-terrorism efforts. Additionally, international police organizations such as 
Interpol (International Criminal Police Organization) and Europol (European Police Office) 
contribute to the accomplishment of cooperation among police agencies in terrorism matters 
(Deflem, 2010).  
In summary, police services are one of the major tools for preventing, investigating and 
disrupting terrorism in democratic nations. Despite the war on terror rhetoric that “we are at war, 
our enemies in this war are not common criminals, therefore we should fight them using military 
and intelligence methods” and “the war on terror is not just a simple law enforcement matter”, the 
role of police institutions in the fight against terrorism cannot be underestimated or negated 
(Deflem, 2010; Kris, 2011). As a result, the de-politicization of terrorism in favor of an 
understanding of terrorism as a crime, increases the importance attached to inter-agency 
cooperation in counter-terrorism tasks. This includes successful police operations and disruptions 
of terrorist plots across the world, successful terrorism charges and convictions, and the efforts for 
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the adaptation of concepts such as “community policing” and “intelligence-led policing” to the 
policing of terrorism. Thus, the roles and responsibilities of police agencies in counter-terrorism 
domain appear to be expanding. Nevertheless, different characteristics of terrorist acts and their 
perpetrators also suggest that police have a crucial but a much more challenging role in policing 






















Turkish and Canadian Counter-Terrorism Experience 
 In order to understand counter-terrorism and homeland security related approaches, 
strategies and policies followed by the Turkish and Canadian law enforcement agencies, it will 
first be important to understand the historical, political, and institutional contexts in which these 
organizations operate. This chapter will provide the reader with background information about 
these contexts in which the Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) operate.  
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Turkey 
Established in 1923, following a costly war of independence against the occupying powers, 
the security of the Republic of Turkey has been dictated by two main elements: geography and 
longstanding ties with the neighboring countries (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). 
Turkey has a significant geostrategic position in one of the most violent and volatile regions of the 
world. While Turkey faced and was concerned with the Soviet threat two and a half decades ago, 
it is now influenced by the political, economic and security developments in the Middle East, 
Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions. Turkey is now 
a pivotal security player in these regions and beyond. As Lefebvre (2005, p. 105) states, pursuing 
its stakes in these regions and beyond, Turkey “has become a more assertive and independent actor 
on the international stage”.  
In the post-Second World War era, Turkey chose to ally with the Western Bloc and 
consequently this policy led Turkey to become a member of NATO on 18 February 1952 (Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). Since then, Turkey has acted as a strong confederate of NATO 
alliance and NATO has been the cornerstone of Turkey's defense and security policy (Turkish 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015). During the Cold War era, Turkey made a significant 
contribution to the defense and security of the NATO Alliance. Having the longest border with the 
former Soviet Union, Turkey was strategically the most significant country in terms of defending 
one-third of the Alliance's land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact (Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2015). At the same time, Turkey also strived to alleviate tensions and conflict between the 
Eastern and Western blocs. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey began to adjust itself to 
the changing security environment. However, NATO remained as a significant determinant in 
Turkish foreign, defense and security policy (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).  
The geostrategic importance of Turkey, however, has not declined with the end of the Cold 
War (Lefebvre, 2005). Turkey, as a charter member of the UN, a stanch member of NATO alliance, 
and as a country aiming to become a full member of the European Union (EU), remains a key ally 
of the US and Western countries. While strengthening its relations with the US and European 
countries; Turkey is also developing its relations with countries in the Balkans, Middle East and 
North Africa, Southern Caucasus, South and Central Asia (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2015). In the aftermath of the Cold War, the world experienced a rapid change accelerated by 
globalization (Yilmaz, 2011). Globalization and rapid scientific developments have contributed to 
positive developments such as increasing communication and relations between countries and 
people, but also to the emergence of global risks and challenges that concern international security 
such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime 
and illegal immigration. As such, Turkey is also subject to many issues of current international 
concern and challenges such as security threats from neighbouring countries or terrorist groups, 
energy supplies important for its security, economic development and their geographical routing, 
or foreign perceptions of its respect for human rights (Lefebvre, 2005).  
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One of the major challenges Turkey is currently facing is the threat of terrorism which 
seriously compromises international security, especially in and around the Middle East region. 
Turkey has experienced sporadic and relentless subnational and state-sponsored terrorism for 
several decades (Yilmaz, 2011). Terrorism has been a leading problem for Turkey in terms of 
economic, cultural, political and military aspects particularly since the beginning of 1960s. The 
terrorist activities that so far have affected Turkey derive from ideological, religious and ethnic 
sources. In the 1970s, Armenian terrorist organizations started targeting Turkish diplomats 
(Haberfeld, King, & Lieberman, 2009). Members of ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide) murdered 71 
people including 34 Turkish diplomats, their family members and civilians in their terrorist attacks 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Turkish National Police, 2014).  
Left-wing terrorist groups have also been active in Turkey for the past few decades. 
Extreme leftist terrorist groups espousing a Marxist/Leninist ideology sought to destroy the current 
political system and overthrow the government through a revolution for the purposes of 
establishing a Marxist regime. DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), 
TKP/ML (Turkish Communist Party/Marxist Leninist), MKP (Maoist Communist Party) and 
MLKP (Marxist Leninist Communist Party) are the prominent left-wing terrorist organizations 
acting in Turkey. Among these, DHKP/C is the most active one with its activities mainly focusing 
on armed attacks, assassinations, suicide bombings, illegal demonstrations and fundraising 
through racketeering, extortion, burglary, robbery and other thefts, donations and drug smuggling 
(Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006; Turkish National Police, 2014). DHKP/C mainly targets current and 
former government officials, law enforcement members and US and Western interests. On 
February 1, 2013, a DHKP/C member conducted a suicide attack against the US embassy in 
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Ankara, Turkey resulting in the death of the perpetrator and a Turkish security guard serving in 
the embassy. This suicide attack against one of the most protected sites in Turkey clearly reveals 
the threat potential of DHKP/C for Turkey and its allies.  
Turkey has been dealing with separatist/ethno-nationalist terrorism since the beginning of 
the 1980s. The southeastern part of Turkey has been a major area of conflict in regard to the 
Kurdish population, which is estimated to be between 12 and 15 million. In the last three decades 
a significant portion of the terrorist incidents in Turkey have been carried out by this population 
(Haberfeld et al., 2009). The Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is the 
primary separatist terrorist organization which aims to establish an independent Kurdish state in 
Eastern and Southeastern part of Turkey by utilizing violence. At the same time, the ultimate goal 
of the PKK was to expand this territory to include parts of northern Iraq, northern Syria and western 
Iran inhabited by Kurdish population, creating a “Greater Kurdistan” (Sozen, 2006). Moreover, in 
its “Foundation Statement”, the PKK made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered through 
Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran (Gergin et al., 2009). The so-called party program of the PKK also 
openly claimed that Kurdistan is divided by four colonizers, namely, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria 
(Yilmaz, 2011). As a result, the PKK and the so-called Kurdish problem have been an issue not 
only for Turkey, but also for Iraq, Iran, and Syria over time. This terrorist organization claims to 
advocate for the rights of Turkey’s Kurdish population. However, it is important to note that the 
PKK does not represent the view of the majority of the Kurdish population although it has gained 
popularity and found support among radical groups (Akyuz & Armstrong, 2011; Yilmaz, 2011).  
It has been about 30 years since the PKK first launched its attacks against the Turkish 
government and civil targets. During this time period about 35.000 people have lost their lives in 
the terrorist campaign of the PKK (Yilmaz, 2011). The PKK has also been designated as a terrorist 
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organization by the US and the European Union. Over the years, the PKK goals seem to have 
changed from its initial plans to establish an independent Kurdish state to current ones of 
recognizing Kurdish political, social and cultural rights within a decentralised Turkey (Gunter, 
2013). After periods of sporadic and relentless violence, Turkey’s increasing pressure led to the 
removal of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from his safe house in Syria in 1998 and subsequently 
he was arrested in Nairobi on February 15, 1999. Although there was a de-escalation in the PKK 
violence in the aftermath of Ocalan’s arrest, violence started again in the summer of 2004 and 
increased gradually. By 2012 there were more deaths due to PKK violence than at any time since 
the late 1990s (Gunter, 2013).  
During the 30 years long of the PKK terrorist campaign, there were attempts to find a 
solution to the so-called Kurdish problem. In 2009, the Turkish government announced its decision 
to initiate a Kurdish opening or Kurdish initiative (Kurt acilimi) in order to address the country’s 
Kurdish question. However, this Kurdish opening failed due to several reasons such as the timing 
of the attempt, an apparent lack of an overall framework specifying how the discussion should 
develop, and a lack of specific proposals (Aydinli & Ozcan, 2011; Gunter, 2013). Other reasons 
included a failure to marginalize the radical elements on the Kurdish side such as the PKK and a 
lack of consensus among the Turkish political parties (Aydinli & Ozcan, 2011; Gunter, 2013). In 
2013, the Turkish government restarted the Kurdish initiative and officials from the Turkish 
National Intelligence Organization (MIT) started meetings with prominent PKK leaders (Gunter, 
2013).  
However, despite the deescalating violence since 2013, it seems unclear how the peace 
process will progress. According to Gunter (2013, p. 94) “hopes for a successful conclusion of 
Turkey’s new Kurdish Opening appear tenuous for several reasons”. PKK proposals for local 
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autonomy and radical decentralization which would give its supporters and Ocalan (their leader) 
significant power are problematic and are not likely to be accepted by the Turkish state, a strongly 
centralized state since its foundation in 1923. On the other hand, complete disarmament of the 
PKK and the withdrawal of PKK militants from the Turkish territory seem to prove difficult as the 
PKK states that it should have a role in maintaining security in the southeastern part of Turkey 
(Gunter, 2013). As a result, there appear to be multiple issues to overcome before any permanent 
resolution can be reached regarding the Kurdish issue.  
Religiously motivated terrorism and Al-Qaeda connected international terrorist groups 
have also been active in Turkey for the last three decades. Religiously motivated terrorist 
organizations favouring the establishment of an Islamic state began to emerge in Turkey following 
the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 (Caglar, 2006). The most well-known religiously motivated 
terrorist groups in Turkey are; Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C (Islamic Great East Raiders-Front), 
ICCB-AFID (Anatolian Federal Islamic State), Tevhid-Selam (Kudus Ordusu-Quds Army) and 
Al-Qaeda. During their terrorist campaigns these terrorist organizations mainly targeted 
journalists, businessmen, intellectuals, security forces, Christian churches, publishing houses, 
secular TV transmitters and newspapers (Lefebvre, 2005; Cline, 2004). Among these terrorist 
organizations, the activities of Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-C and ICCB-AFID were neutralized to 
a great extent. Successful police operations based on quality intelligence and government 
crackdown led to the arrests of a great number of members and supporters of these terrorist 
organizations (Cline, 2004).  
On 15-20 November 2003, Turkey experienced Al-Qaeda connected international 
terrorism with the car bombing of two synagogues in Istanbul and the truck bombings of the HSBC 
Bank and the British Consulate leaving 62 people dead and over 650 injured. Some of the 
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perpetrators in these attacks had reportedly attended terrorist training in camps in Afghanistan. It 
also became apparent that the individuals who were involved in the bombings were Al-Qaeda 
linked extremists. Since then, Turkish police forces have carried out successful operations against 
Al-Qaeda inspired or affiliated individuals located in Turkey and multiple terrorist plots were 
thwarted before happening. However, elements of international terrorism continue to pose a threat 
and suggest continued security problems for Turkey, especially with the emergence of new 
organizations. 
The Interior Ministry of Turkey is the key agency responding to these terrorist threats. 
Under the Turkish Ministry of Interior there are two major institutions responsible for counter-
terrorism activities in Turkey: the Turkish National Police (TNP) and Turkish Gendarmerie forces. 
Counter-terrorism responsibilities are divided according to jurisdiction. TNP is responsible for the 
policing of urban areas and the Turkish Gendarmerie is responsible for maintaining security and 
public order in rural areas of Turkey. In Turkey, there is also the National Intelligence Service 
(MIT-Milli Istihbarat Teskilati) that is responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating 
intelligence on terrorism and threats to the national security of Turkey. The Turkish National 
Intelligence Organization combines the functions of both internal and external intelligence 
agencies. Collecting intelligence regarding terrorist activities is one of the top priorities of MIT. 
Other government institutions such as Turkish Armed Forces General Staff (Genelkurmay 
Baskanligi), Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK), Directorate General of Customs 
Enforcement (Gumrukler Muhafaza Genel Mudurlugu) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs also have 
roles and responsibilities in the field of national security and counter-terrorism. In the following 
section, I provide some additional information about the TNP, one of the targets of this research, 
in order to further familiarize the reader with its structure and counter-terrorism duties. 
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Turkish National Police (TNP) 
The Turkish National Police (TNP) operates under the Ministry of Interior of Turkey. 
According to legislation and practices, the central and regional structure of the Turkish National 
Police force is defined as a law enforcement unit that operates within the network of the civil 
administration system and carries out its duties under the command and control of the civil 
authority (OSCE, 2015). TNP is mainly responsible for the policing of urban areas, such as cities 
and towns. The primary duties of the TNP are to maintain public order; to provide security of 
persons and properties; to detect, arrest and transfer both offenders and case evidence to the 
appropriate judicial bodies and to prevent crimes in order to protect public safety and order. 
Additionally, the Turkish National Police has counter-terrorism and national security related duties 
and responsibilities such as intelligence collection and analysis regarding terrorist activities, 
investigation of terrorist offences and the execution of tactical operations against terrorist 
organizations. These counter-terrorism functions are carried out by three separate departments 
within the TNP structure: the TNP Intelligence Department, the Counter-terrorism Department and 
the Special Operations Department. These departments are structured both at central and provincial 
levels. The central organizations at the Department level are within the Turkish National Police 
General Headquarters located in the capital, Ankara. Departments have also branch-level 
extensions in provinces and office-level extensions in districts (Turkish National Police, 2014). 
According to a Turkish National Police Report (2014), the TNP Intelligence Department 
is focused on criminal and security intelligence gathering inside Turkey. The department is 
responsible for intelligence-gathering and analysis concerning terrorism, organized crime, and 
crimes against state security. The TNP Intelligence Department also disseminates intelligence 
collected to appropriate operational units within the TNP for further action such as judicial 
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investigations and tactical operations. Unlike the general policing duty of the TNP in urban areas 
of Turkey, the TNP Intelligence Department is authorized to collect intelligence throughout the 
country including both the urban and the rural areas. The TNP Intelligence Department is also 
engaged in international security cooperation activities against terrorism and intelligence sharing 
with partner police agencies through its International Relations Section (Personal experience).  
The TNP Counter-terrorism Department is responsible for investigating terrorism-related 
offences under the Turkish Anti-terrorism Act. Counter-terrorism department units in the TNP 
investigate terror incidents, collect evidence, detain suspects and perform the judicial process 
regarding the terrorist offences (Turkish National Police, 2014). The TNP Counter-terrorism 
Department is also engaged in community outreach activities to prevent the radicalization of 
vulnerable youth and to prevent the recruitment activities of terrorist organizations (Turkish 
National Police, 2014).  
The TNP Special Operations Department is a special counterterrorist unit which has a 
mandate to perform tactical operations against terrorist targets in urban and rural areas by using 
special weapons, equipment and tactics (Turkish National Police, 2014). The TNP Special 
Operations unit members sometimes take place in hostage rescue operations as well. Members of 
the TNP Special Operations Department are highly trained in using firearms, hostage-rescue 
techniques and high-risk arrest situations (Turkish National Police, 2014).  
All these three departments of TNP work closely in carrying out their counter-terrorist 
functions. The counter-terrorist intelligence collected and analyzed by TNP Intelligence 
Department is disseminated to TNP Counter-terrorism Department for further action such as 
criminal investigation of terrorism cases and the arrest of terror suspects (Turkish National Police, 
2014). In case of high-risk arrest situations and the possibility of armed clash between the police 
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and terrorists, TNP Special Operations Department units are deployed for engagement in the 
counter-terrorist operations. A continuous information sharing regarding terrorist threats takes 
place between these three departments in national and local levels.  
The Turkish National Police is attaching great importance to international relations and 
cooperation with its foreign partners (Personal experience, Turkish National Police Training 
Department, 2011). Thus, the TNP is actively participating in international cooperation against 
terrorism. Within the scope of the Security Cooperation Agreements signed between Turkey and 
foreign countries, TNP is actively sharing intelligence regarding terrorism with its international 
partners, conducting joint investigative and operational activities against terrorists and terrorist 
organizations and providing counter-terrorism training to the police services of partner states 
(Personal experience, Turkish National Police Training Department, 2011). Within INTERPOL, 
TNP has also been one of the first and oldest INTERPOL members, having been part of Interpol 
since 1930 (INTERPOL, 2015).  
The Turkish National Police have respect for human rights in the fulfillment of all its duties, 
in conformity with the principles of rule of law (OSCE, 2015). Thus, the TNP has increasingly 
placed importance on training and education of its members. The qualification of the police force 
has improved a great deal by raising the level of education and sending a large number of personnel 
abroad for training in different fields (OSCE, 2015). The TNP puts a great emphasis on the 
protection of human rights and the maintenance of the rule of law in performing its counter-
terrorism functions as well (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The TNP has made a great progress in the 
prevention of violations of fundamental human rights in the enforcement of counter-terrorism 
measures (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). Haberfeld et al. (2009, p. 97) state that there is a strong 
recognition among the Turkish police officials that “terrorism has to be targeted in a non-
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traditional way involving both law enforcement and the public”. The TNP have recognized the 
importance of prevention of the recruitment activities of terrorist organizations and the treatment 
of terrorist suspects within the framework of human rights in order to prevent the progression of 
potential sympathizers and passive supporters into active participation in terrorist activities 
(Haberfeld et al., 2009; Ozeren & Cinoglu, 2006). This approach is extremely important in terms 
of proactive counter-terrorism and the prevention of terrorist recruitment, as it is already a well-
established fact that terrorist organizations aim to create a perception among their target audience 
that the police is an instrument to deliver oppressive governmental policies in order to protect the 
existing regime and the state at the expense of human rights and civil liberties.  
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in Canada 
 Canada, a liberal democracy and a multicultural nation with an enormous diversity of 
racial, ethnic and religious backgrounds, requires security in order to safeguard the way of life 
enjoyed by the people that live within its borders. In today’s world, external and internal threats to 
national security are multi-faceted and constantly evolving (Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service, 2015). Traditional security issues as well as new and evolving risks and threats such as 
terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national organized crime and illegal 
immigration jeopardize the security of liberal democracies (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
2015). Canada is also affected by this changing security environment. Canada’s security interests 
are defined by its identity and geography (Kitchen & Sasikumar, 2009). In the aftermath of both 
World Wars and during the Cold War, Canada, like Turkey, remained a part of the Western Bloc. 
Kitchen and Sasikumar (2009) state that during the Cold War Canadian security interests were 
always defined not just in national terms, but also in terms of the security of the West as a whole.  
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Canada is a member of the longstanding UKUSA security agreement which was 
established in 1948 for signals intelligence (SIGINT) cooperation and information sharing between 
the partner states. This agreement also named ‘Five Eyes’ involves the US National Security 
Agency (NSA), UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Canada’s 
Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Australia’s Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) 
and New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) (Rudner, 2002, 2007). 
There are also some other more limited third parties (e.g. Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Turkey) involved in global signals intelligence collection, processing and sharing (Rudner, 2002, 
2007). The geographical position of Canada can be said to have provided it with some advantages 
in this longstanding SIGINT partnership. As Rudner (2002) states, Canada’s role in the UKUSA 
alliance was valued more for its unique geographic advantages. During the Cold War era, Canadian 
signals intelligence focused on communications across the northern Soviet Union and East Asia, 
and also the interception facilities of Canada targeted Latin American satellite relays (Rudner, 
2002). In return, Canada was provided with connectivity to a world-wide capability to collect and 
deliver real-time communications interceptions on foreign targets, as well as access to the most 
sophisticated signals intelligence technologies (Rudner, 2007). These have a crucial role in global 
counter-terrorism efforts.  
Canada’s geographical position and Canada’s longstanding Canada-US security relations 
are critical to understanding its security position. Having the longest non-militarized border in the 
world and being long-standing allies since the World War I, Canada and the United States have a 
long history of partnership on every imaginable issue. They are dependent on each other in security 
issues due to their shared border, however, beyond the geographical proximity, they have the same 
security/sovereignty concerns, crucial economic relations and shared cultural identity (Kitchen & 
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Sasikumar, 2009, Roach, 2012a). James (2012) argues that relations with the US tower above all 
others for Canada in terms of both importance and difficulty. In accordance with these uniquely 
close ties and shared interests, one can expect to see concurrence between Canadian and US 
policies. However, we note a reasonable amount of difference between US and Canadian policy 
choices on several issues including counter-terrorism (Kitchen & Sasikumar, 2009). There are 
differences in American and Canadian counter-terrorism which reflect each country’s history and 
legal systems (Roach, 2012a). A number of well-publicized counter-terrorism cases illustrate this 
point.  For example, Maher Arar is a Syrian-born Canadian citizen who was detained by US 
authorities based on suspicions that he had links to Al-Qaeda. He was secretly extradited to Syria 
by US authorities where he was tortured and imprisoned for almost a year before returning to 
Canada. Subsequently, Arar was pardoned by a Canadian quasi-judicial public inquiry3 in 2006 
and his civil claim for 10.5 million dollars was awarded by the Canadian government. However, 
despite all the efforts of Canadian officials, Arar continued to remain on American watch-lists and 
his civil claim against the US officials was rejected by the American judiciary (Roach, 2012a). 
This case is an example of the distinctions between Canadian and American responses to counter-
terrorism. In their counter-terrorism approaches, Canada has been more concerned about the 
violation of human/individual rights and generally prioritized rights over security by virtue of 
independent Canadian courts and quasi-judicial public inquiries that have played a vigorous role 
in auditing counter-terrorism actions by the officials. The US, on the other hand, has seen terrorism 
as an external threat requiring a military response and has used military detention and commissions 
as a way to deal with terrorists (Roach, 2012a).  
3 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar: Analysis and 
Recommendations (2006) 
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An important factor in shaping the counter-terrorism policy in Canada is the national 
identity. Kitchen and Sasikumar (2009) argue that the way a country defines itself influences its 
threat perception and responses. Some parts of Canadian identity are shared with US Americans, 
however, at some points Canadians differentiate themselves from Americans. This differentiation 
influences Canadian security and foreign policy as well and makes Canada sometimes have 
different views or interests than the US. This sometimes results in differences between Canadian 
and American counter-terrorism policies (Kitchen & Sasikumar, 2009).  
Sovereignty and economic concerns are also important determinants in Canadian-
American security relations. In this respect, the events of 9/11 are a good illustration of the 
sovereignty concerns and economic issues within Canadian counter-terrorism policies. Canada, as 
a member of the Western alliance and a close partner of the US, reacted strongly to the 9/11 attacks 
by taking some important steps such as enacting the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act 2001, increasing 
its security budget and supporting the US-led military campaign in Afghanistan. However, 
Canada’s response to the 9/11 attacks should also be analyzed in terms of sovereignty and 
economic concerns. For example, keeping the border with the US open to avoid enormous 
economic losses (which would follow from any sustained closing of the border) was the other 
important determinant of Canada’s response to 9/11. This was in addition to ensuring that the US 
response to 9/11 did not have a negative impact on the security and sovereignty of Canada. In his 
book Canada and Conflict, James (2012) states the following issues regarding Canadian response 
to 9/11: 
Canada’s response to 9/11, in the specific context of continental security, can be seen in 
terms of protecting sovereignty. While Canada joined forces with the US against terrorism, 
it also did so with caution and attention to the desire to balance security needs against 
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potential problems arising with respect to civil rights. Thus Canada attempted to preserve 
its sovereignty by taking measures necessary to ensure the US of its commitment to security 
but staying away, to the extent possible, from any homogenizing effects arising from the 
fear and anxiety in place after 9/11. (p. 84)  
In summary, it can be inferred that despite uniquely close ties and shared economic and 
security interests between Canada and the United States, there have also been disagreements 
between the two neighbours in counter-terrorism matters. Moreover, while these disagreements 
have not predominantly been between the Canadian and American governments which share 
common security and economic interests, they mostly have been between the Canadian judiciary 
that has been more concerned about the violation and the neglect of human rights and the US legal 
system that has deferred to the executive and the military on counter-terrorism issues (Roach, 
2012a). Canada and the United States governments, however, continue working together closely 
in the fight against terrorism. The most recent Perimeter Security Action Plan4 signed in 2011 
between Canada and the US governments can be regarded as proof of this ongoing cooperation in 
security matters. This action plan encourages the intensification of law enforcement intelligence 
sharing between Canadian and the US agencies in order to further strategic interests in identifying 
and addressing threats early. The action plan also promotes cooperative investigation and 
prosecution efforts and transnational criminal investigations and the development of integrated 
cross-border law enforcement operations.  Although there appear to be reasons for concern about 
the protection of individual rights on the Canadian side and about security on the American side, 
it is likely that Canada and the United States will continue cooperating closely on counter-terrorism 
related matters in the future.  
4 Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness 
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In an increasingly globalized world, terrorism is a global issue and Canada is not immune 
to terrorism. As stated in the Government of Canada’s national counter-terrorism strategy, 
Building Resilience Against Terrorism, terrorism is a serious and persistent threat to the security 
of Canada and its citizens (Public Safety Canada, 2013). Twenty-four Canadians were killed in 
9/11 terrorist attacks, however, this was not Canada’s first experience with terrorism. Prior to 9/11, 
Canada was influenced by both domestic and international terrorism (Roach, 2011). At the same 
time, Canada, known for its stance as a peacekeeper country in the international society, has been 
targeted by a small number of foreign terrorist groups (Ilbiz & Curtis, 2015).  
Canada suffered from separatist terrorist actions of the FLQ group that was particularly 
active from the early 1960s to the early 1970s. Between 1963 and 1968, FLQ espoused traditional 
right-wing nationalism and its main demand was the independence of Quebec (Leman-Langlois & 
Brodeur, 2008). Whereas after 1968 it also aimed to emancipate the working class in addition to 
its traditional goal of the independence of Quebec (Leman-Langlois & Brodeur, 2008). After a 
series of attacks and bombings against different targets including government and civil targets, 
during what is known today as October Crisis of 1970, members of the FLQ kidnapped a Quebec 
politician and a British diplomat. As a result, the Canadian government declared Martial Law 
under the War Measures Act and deployed troops into Montreal (Roach, 2012a).  
During the October Crisis, civil rights were suspended, almost 500 people were taken into 
custody on the charges of being a member or supporter of an unlawful organization and several of 
them were detained without judicial review or access to legal counsel. Roach (2012a) states that 
the October crisis of 1970 and the accompanying undemocratic practices have had a longstanding 
effect on Canadian counter-terrorism policy. It fostered the enactment of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and the removal of national security intelligence collection duty from RCMP 
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(Roach, 2012a). This resulted because of the illegal activities of the RCMP in the wake of the 
crisis. Security intelligence collection function was subsequently assigned to the newly established 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) which is a civilian security intelligence agency 
without law enforcement powers and subject to extensive review by the Security Intelligence 
Review Committee (SIRC) (Charters, 2008).  
Canada has also suffered from international terrorism including an incident in 1985. In 
1985, Sikh separatists were responsible for the most lethal act of aviation terrorism before 9/11. 
The bombing of Air India Flight 182 on June 23, 1985 on its way from Vancouver to New Delhi 
resulted in the killing of 329 passengers of whom 280 were Canadian citizens. Two men alleged 
to have been involved in the perpetration of the attack were subsequently acquitted in 2005. A 
public inquiry5 into the Air India bombing subsequently revealed the intelligence failures at the 
time of the attack. This public inquiry also documented how the post-bombing investigation of the 
incident was impaired by a lack of cooperation between CSIS and the RCMP, the routine 
destruction of the wiretaps by the CSIS on the alleged mastermind of the Air India bombing plot, 
and the poor handling and protection of witnesses (Roach, 2011, 2012a). Based on Canada’s 
response to Air India bombing, it can be argued that whereas Canada overreacted to the October 
Crisis of 1970, its response both before and after the Air India bombing can be interpreted as a 
number of critical failures that happened amongst Canada’s intelligence agencies.  
As of today, terrorism continues to remain the leading threat to the national security of 
Canada (Public Safety Canada, 2014). Canadians are increasingly concerned that some young 
Canadian citizens have been recruited for terrorist movements abroad, including Somalia, Syria, 
and now Iraq. According to official reports, as of early 2014, there were more than 130 individuals 
5 Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy 
(Ottawa: Public Works, 2010).  
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with Canadian connections who were abroad and who were suspected of taking part in terrorism-
related activities (Public Safety Canada, 2014). These Canadian extremist travellers participated 
in active combat as well as other terrorism-related activities such as collecting money for terrorist 
purposes, propaganda, training and providing other kinds of support to terrorist organizations. 
These individuals could perpetrate terrorist attacks once they return to Canada. In order to address 
the threat of extremist travellers, the Canadian government enacted The Combatting Terrorism Act 
in July 2013. This act created four new offences intended to prevent and deter people from leaving 
Canada for terrorism-related purposes (Public Safety Canada, 2014).  
Canada’s security is also threatened by the increasing risk of homegrown terrorism and 
violent extremists acting in small cells or as individuals who are often inspired by Al-Qaeda’s 
violent ideology. The arrest of eighteen Canadians in Toronto in 2006 for allegedly planning to 
kill fellow citizens is just one example of the growing threat of homegrown terrorism (Wilner, 
2008). In April 2013, the RCMP arrested two people who were charged with plotting to attack a 
VIA Rail train travelling between New York and Toronto. The recent terrorist attacks in Ottawa 
and Quebec suggest that homegrown terrorism continues to threaten Canada. The Canadian 
government has recently introduced new legislation called Bill C-51 in order to expand powers for 
Canada's police and intelligence agencies to combat domestic extremism and prevent potential 
terrorist attacks (Payton, 2015). Moreover, Canada’s deployment of fighter jets for the US-led 
combat mission against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist organization may 
also encourage some terrorist groups to target Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests in the 
foreseeable future.   
Major Canadian agencies that have roles and responsibilities in responding to terrorism are 
Public Safety Canada, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Canadian Security 
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Intelligence Service (CSIS). There are also other government actors involved in protecting 
Canada’s national security such as Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA), Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), and Department of Justice. However, these 
three agencies are the main actors that are primarily responsible for counter-terrorism and national 
security of Canada. Within the scope of this study, the primary focus will be on RCMP’s role in 
counter-terrorism structure of the Government of Canada and the counter-terrorism measures 
implemented by the RCMP. Therefore, in the following paragraphs, I will provide some 
background information about the RCMP and its national security and counter-terrorism mandate. 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is Canada’s national police force that was established 
in 1873. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a national, federal, provincial and municipal 
policing body and provides a total federal policing service to all Canadians and policing services 
under contract to the three territories, eight provinces (except Ontario and Quebec), more than 150 
municipalities, more than 600 Aboriginal communities and three international airports (RCMP, 
2015). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police was under the Department of Justice until it was 
transferred to Public Safety Canada when that department was created in 2003 (Deflem, 2010). At 
the federal level, the RCMP is mainly responsible for drug enforcement, immigration and passport 
investigations, investigation of commercial crimes and organized crime and national security 
policing.  
Terrorism is one of the strategic priorities of the RCMP. The Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police has a dual role in combatting threats to the national security of Canada. Under the Security 
Offences Act, the RCMP has primary responsibility for the investigation, prevention and 
prosecution of criminal activities related to national security (O’Connor, 2006). Also, it has a 
56 
 
criminal intelligence role that supports those national security and terrorism investigations and its 
protective policing mandate (Hanniman, 2007; O’Connor, 2006). Accordingly, Hanniman (2007) 
states that the RCMP has adopted an intelligence-led policing model for use in counter-terrorism 
investigations. Canadian Anti-terrorism Act also spells out the RCMP’s role in national security. 
It also facilitates the investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities by accurately stating the 
types of activity falling within the range of interest of RCMP and other police forces in Canada 
(Hanniman, 2007). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is also responsible for investigating 
terrorism-related offences under several acts such as the Security of Information Act, the Security 
Offences Act, as well as any other criminal offence under the Criminal Code of Canada. National 
security-related mandates and responsibilities of the RCMP include national security criminal 
investigations, protective policing, border integrity, critical infrastructure protection, marine 
security, air carrier protection, critical incident management and a host of related support services 
(RCMP, 2015). 
Outreach/awareness at all levels of policing with communities and partners, prevention, 
strategic analysis, information/intelligence sharing, and enforcement are the basic tenets of the 
multifaceted approach of RCMP in counter-terrorism and national security policing (RCMP, 
2015). Conducting criminal investigations into national security-related, terrorist and criminal 
activity is the basis of the RCMP’s national security activities. Accordingly, RCMP maintains a 
nation-wide integrated National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) program. National 
Security Criminal Investigations program aims to reduce the threat of terrorist criminal activity in 
Canada and abroad by preventing, detecting, investigating, and gathering evidence to support the 
prosecution of those involved in national security-related criminal acts (RCMP, 2015).  
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As part of the NSCI program, the RCMP also has Integrated National Security 
Enforcement Teams (INSETs) based in Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal and Ottawa and National 
Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs) in every other province (RCMP, 2015). INSETs are made 
up of representatives of the RCMP, federal partners and agencies and provincial and municipal 
police services, whereas NSESs are solely composed of RCMP employees. The RCMP 
headquarters National Security Criminal Investigations Directorate is responsible for overseeing 
the INSETs and NSESs (Hanniman, 2007). INSETs collect, share and analyze information and 
intelligence about criminal threats to national security and criminal extremism/terrorism. NSES 
members conduct national security criminal investigations and provide specialized expertise for 
the RCMP's national security-related responsibilities (RCMP, 2015). These teams play a critical 
role in national security criminal investigations by enhancing RCMP's capacity to collect, share, 
and analyze intelligence to lead effective law enforcement actions in preventing terrorist activity. 
Additionally, the benefit of this integrated policing approach is to leverage the resources and 
mandates of multiple law enforcement agencies and other federal/provincial and municipal 
partners to achieve shared strategic and tactical objectives (RCMP, 2015). INSETs and NSESs 
work in collaboration with both domestic and foreign partners in their investigations into terrorist 
activities.  
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police is also committed to working in partnership with 
domestic partners at the federal and provincial level and private sector stakeholders to enhance 
prevention measures against the threat of terrorism towards critical infrastructure. As part of its 
mandate, the RCMP has developed the Suspicious Incident Reporting system to gather information 
from industry and law enforcement about suspicious incidents that may have a nexus to national 
security (RCMP, 2015). Another issue that the RCMP attach importance to is its efforts to counter 
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the threat of terrorism through engagement with local communities. In this context, the National 
Security Community Outreach program was created in order to engage the communities most 
impacted by RCMP national security criminal investigations (RCMP, 2015). Hanniman (2008) 
argues that the creation of the RCMP’s National Security Community Outreach Program aimed to 
involve the diverse communities of Canada in the protection of Canada’s national security by 
employing community policing principles. Members of different ethnic, racial and religious 
communities would feel that they belong to Canadian society and work all together for the same 
purpose which is the protection of Canada and its people. Through the National Security 
Community Outreach program, the RCMP also aimed to counter violent extremism and 
radicalization leading to violence by addressing potential political violence and identifying and 
addressing the concerns of minority communities (Public Safety Canada, 2013).  
Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the history and geopolitics of Turkey and Canada. It has also 
looked at the terrorism and counter-terrorism experiences of both countries and the key 
organizations that perform counter-terrorism functions in those countries. The chapter has 
illustrated that Turkey has an older counter-terrorism strategy than Canada, and sits in a strategic 
position vis a vis the Caucasus, Europe and Middle East. Turkey has been struggling with terrorism 
and political violence since the beginning of 1960s and Turkish law enforcement has considerable 
experience in dealing with different types of terrorist cases. On the other hand, while Canada has 
a more recent history of terrorism, it has a unique position because of its relationship with the U.S. 
and it is not entirely unfamiliar with terrorist activities. Though Canada has not experienced the 
same scale of terrorist violence as Turkey, Canada has experienced separatist, international and 
homegrown terrorism over time. While both countries are the targets of terrorist attacks by Al-
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Qaeda inspired jihadist groups, Turkey faces a more significant threat from separatist/ethno-
nationalist and religious terrorism.  
There are also similarities and differences in the major counter-terrorism agencies of both 
countries. There is a more centralised counter-terrorism structure in Canada as compared to 
Turkey. While the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in Canada ensures 
coordination across key federal departments and agencies responsible for national security and 
counter-terrorism, there is not a dedicated department or ministry in the administrative structure 
of Turkey which is tasked with the coordination of agencies involved in counter-terrorism 
functions. At the same time, both Turkey and Canada have a national police agency and these 
national police services are the lead agencies in preventing and responding to terrorism in both 
countries. In Turkey, the Turkish National Police (TNP) is the primary agency responsible for 
prevention and criminal investigation of terrorist offences, whereas in Canada the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) has the primary responsibility for national security law enforcement.  
In regard to the intelligence structure of the two countries, Turkey has a national 
intelligence service (MIT-Turkish National Intelligence Organization) which is authorized both at 
home and abroad to collect intelligence regarding national security. In this manner, MIT combines 
the functions of both domestic and foreign intelligence agencies. On the other hand, Canada has 
no dedicated foreign intelligence service (like the CIA) with jurisdiction outside the country 
although Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) collects and analyzes security intelligence 
from across the country and abroad.  
Before proceeding with the comparative analysis of the counter-terrorism measures and 







A research design refers to a flexible set of guidelines that connects theoretical paradigms to 
strategies of inquiry and methods for collecting empirical material (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). 
Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 14) state that “a research design situates researchers in the empirical 
world and connects them to specific sites, people, groups, institutions, and bodies of relevant 
interpretive material, including documents and archives”. To investigate Turkish and Canadian 
police organizations’ response to terrorism, this research used a qualitative comparative (multiple) 
case study approach.  
Given the nature of this study and the nature of terrorism studies in general, a qualitative 
research design seemed well-suited. Detailed qualitative accounts might offer a more profound 
and comprehensive understanding of the particular phenomenon being studied, which may not be 
identified through using quantitative, experimental or survey researches. This qualitative case 
study aims to provide rich and detailed descriptions through analyzing official and non-official 
documents concerning the cases. In this regard, this study will take an interpretive approach rather 
than a positivist approach in analyzing the cases. The researcher seeks to discover the meaning of 
the events from a law enforcement perspective rather than to test theories and causal relationships 
between variables.  
Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 301) defines the case study as “an intensive analysis of an individual unit 
(as a person or community) stressing developmental factors in relation to environment. Hesse-
Biber and Leavy (2011) offer a broad definition of the case study approach as the following: 
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Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and 
uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme or system in a “real life” 
context. It is research-based, inclusive of different methods and is evidence-led. The primary 
purpose is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic…, programme, policy, 
institution or system to generate knowledge and/or to inform policy development, 
professional practice and civil or community action. (p. 256) 
Case studies have long been used for conducting research in education, child and youth 
development, international affairs, public policy and in business and public administration (Yin, 
2003). Case studies can be conducted qualitatively, quantitatively, analytically or hermeneutically, 
or by using mixed methods (Flyvbjerg, 2011). According to Berg (2004, p. 251), “case study 
methods involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social 
setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates 
or functions”. Case studies may employ a number of data-gathering techniques such as life 
histories, ethnography, document analysis, interviews, and participant observation. Berg (2004) 
states that extremely rich, detailed, and in-depth information characterize the type of information 
collected in a case study.  
In terms of case study design type, this study can be categorized as an exploratory and 
instrumental case study. In an instrumental case study, a case is studied to provide insight into a 
larger topic or to revise a generalization (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2011). In this research, the choice 
of instrumental case study is made because it is expected to advance our understanding of some 
other research interest. The case itself serves a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of 
something else (Berg, 2004). This case study aims to facilitate our understanding of police 
responses to terrorism. On the other hand, this research is an example of a comparative case study 
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which can be described as “a set of multiple case studies of multiple research entities for the 
purpose of cross-unit comparison” (Berg, 2004, p. 258). A purpose of this research is to compare 
the counter-terrorism strategies and measures of the Turkish and Canadian police organizations.  
Research Questions 
This thesis attempts to explore the following research questions. These questions are 
examined with a comparative, case study methodology. These are:  
• Following large scale terrorist attacks and incidents around the world and the ever-
changing nature of terrorism, what are the main strategies and objectives which 
international police agencies pursue in preventing and responding to terrorism? 
• What similarities and differences emerge between the counter-terrorism responses of the 
police organizations in different parts of the world, in particular between western and non-
western countries? 
• What are the main unique characteristics of counter-terrorism responses of each the 
Turkish National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and what 
are their differences and similarities? 
• Which theoretical model of counter-terrorism dominates the Turkish National Police 
(TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) response to terrorism? 
Data Collection 
Data for this research mainly relies on a comprehensive review of the literature and the 
consulting of official and non-official documents. One method of data collection employed in this 
study is archival research that can be defined as “the locating, evaluating, and systematic 
interpretation and analysis of sources found in archives” (Corti, 2004, p. 21). Fitzgerald and Cox 
(2002, p. 127) define archival research as “research based upon analysis of existing sources of 
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information”. Archival data may include public documents and official records (such as 
government papers or reports), organizational records, medical records, personal collections, 
written or taped records of speeches, photographs, newspapers, books, secondary data archives 
and other contextual materials (Corti, 2004; Palys & Atchison, 2008). Archival research can be 
classified as one of the unobtrusive or non-reactive data collection techniques in social science 
research (Fitzgerald & Cox, 2002; Palys & Atchison, 2008). In the archival research, available 
data may be consulted and analyzed for purposes other than those for which they were originally 
produced (Singleton & Straits, 2005). Corti (2004, p. 21) notes that archival research can be used 
to “ask new questions of old data, provide a comparison over time or between geographic areas, 
verify or challenge existing findings, or draw together evidence from disparate sources to provide 
a bigger picture”. 
Archival measures can be utilized rather effectively to conduct research, especially when 
used in conjunction with other techniques of data collection (Corti, 2004). Corti (2004, p. 21) notes 
that “consulting archival sources enables the social scientist to both enhance and challenge the 
established methods of defining and collecting data”. Studying archival materials provides the 
researcher with numerous advantages. Archival research is often the only way of collecting data 
regarding past events, conducting such research is relatively inexpensive, and as with other 
unobtrusive measures, archival data are generally less influenced by reactivity than interactive 
techniques (Fitzgerald & Cox, 2002; Palys & Atchison, 2008). Studying archival materials also 
allows the researcher to go back to a given document or archive over and over to subject it to 
greater or different examination (Palys & Atchison, 2008). The researcher consulted and reviewed 
as many print and electronic documents as possible in order to gain the insight about the terrorism 
and counter-terrorism experience of Turkish and Canadian police organizations. 
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Turkish, Canadian and American academic literature on terrorism and counter-terrorism 
including academic books and journal articles written by inside and outside counter-terrorism 
experts provided considerable data for this study. Academic journal articles and books provided 
objective and comprehensive knowledge regarding the phenomenon of terrorism and Turkish and 
Canadian counter-terrorism practices. For example, terrorism scholar Martha Crenshaw’s articles 
which were selected for this thesis provided substantial knowledge on instrumental and 
organizational explanations of terrorism. The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research (2013) 
written by famous terrorism and counter-terrorism scholar Alex P. Schmid, was a widely cited 
source used in this research. In terms of Turkish counter-terrorism experience, this thesis usually 
benefited from the academic articles written by TNP counter-terrorism experts. Another major 
source of data for Turkish counter-terrorism experience was the NATO Science for Peace and 
Security Series books that published many articles by Turkish scholars. The researcher got 
substantial data about Turkish law enforcement response to terrorism from academic sources. 
Academic journal articles published by Canadian scholars provided detailed insight about 
Canadian counter-terrorism responses. Among these were Jacoby’s (2004) study on Canadian 
democracy and the campaign against global terrorism, Kitchen and Sasikumar’s (2009) article on 
US-Canada relations and counter-terrorism policy, Roach’s (2006, 2011, 2012a, 2012b) 
comparative research on Canadian responses to terrorism before and after 9/11, and comparison 
of American and Canadian counter-terrorism policies, Rudner’s (2002, 2004, 2007) research on 
Canadian intelligence community. These academic sources were easily accessible from the 
university library and provided substantial unclassified data about both Turkish and Canadian 
counter-terrorism responses.  
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Another source of data used in this research include official documents published on 
terrorism issues such as government reports and police training catalogues. The researcher greatly 
benefited from the official reports published by the Canadian government agencies such as the 
Public Safety Canada’s reports on terrorist threats to Canada and the annual public report of the 
CSIS. Another example of government reports cited in this research is Building Resilience Against 
Terrorism: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy (2013) published by Public Safety Canada. 
Official documents were particularly useful in understanding the Canadian response to terrorism. 
In terms of Turkish case, the researcher made use of TNP’s official documents such as the 
international training catalogue of TNP Training Department. Despite the fact that reports by 
governments and agencies that deal with terrorism may have a political agenda, official documents 
provided considerable amount of data for this thesis. This included data on current terrorism 
threats, the roles and responsibilities of counter-terrorism agencies, and the fundamental principles 
underpinning the counter-terrorism strategies of each country.  
Another source of data consulted in this thesis are the reports of think tank organisations 
which are engaged in terrorism and security research. These think tank organizations include Royal 
United Services Institute (RUSI), Brookings Institute for Strategic Dialogue, UTSAM (Turkish 
National Police Academy International Research Center for Terrorism and Transnational Crime), 
Canadian International Council (CIC) and Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute 
(CDFAI). A reason for including think tank reports in this research is that much well-informed 
research on terrorism and counter-terrorism has often been conducted by trusted researchers with 
security clearances at think tanks (Schmid, 2013a). Edwards, Jeffray, and Pantucci’s (2015) report 
on the role of community policing in preventing terrorism in Canada is one example of the think 
tank reports employed in this research. 
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Open source data was also consulted in this thesis. Open sources such as official websites of 
the Turkish National Police (TNP), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other related 
government institutions (such as the Public Safety Canada, CSIS, Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, etc.) and the other publicly available documents such as newspaper articles were consulted 
in this research. Open source data was included because it is publicly available and conveniently 
accessible. Open sources such as official websites of the TNP and the RCMP provided detailed 
information on the counter-terrorism structures and responsibilities of these organizations. 
Websites of the national newspapers included data on the current terrorism and counter-terrorism 
developments in each country.  
The researcher also has benefited from classified information in his analysis regarding the 
Turkish case. The researcher’s professional experience and personal acquaintance with counter-
terrorism staff in Turkey allowed him to gain access to classified information. Adana Police 
Department’s booklet entitled “Individual centered procedural approach model in counter 
terrorism” (2013) provided considerable amount of knowledge regarding TNP’s preventive 
responses to terrorism. However, as stated above, a significant portion of the data for this study 
came from unclassified and public sources.  
Doing research on terrorism and counter-terrorism differs from standard social science 
research and offers a number of difficulties and challenges (Schmid, 2013a). Since the researchers 
are dealing with terrorist organizations and/or counter-terrorism structures, even basic data are 
often not accessible in the public domain. According to Robert Asprey (as cited in Schmid, 2013a), 
terrorism is often a “war in the shadows”, despite the significant publicity it often generates. Data 
regarding most failed and foiled terrorist attacks, terrorist methods or counter-terrorism work do 
not often make it into public domain or academia. Therefore, “disinformation and distortions from 
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both terrorists and their opponents are an additional problem for those working exclusively with 
open sources” (Schmid, 2013a, p. 461). Also, because of the dangers of doing research in conflict 
zones with high levels of terrorism, many researchers have often conducted their studies based on 
media news stories or government reports-both often not very reliable sources (Schmid, 2013a). 
Access to classified information and acquiring security clearances have been significant obstacles 
for terrorism researchers.  
The research approval process for most security institutions is long and access to security 
officials is limited (Kitchen, 2014). As a result, much well-informed research on terrorism and 
counter-terrorism has often been conducted by trusted researchers with security clearances at think 
tanks or government agencies themselves (Schmid, 2013a). However, it is not impossible to do 
good research without access to classified information. There is an abundance of credible open 
sources including government and investigatory commissions’ reports, journalistic investigations 
on leaks of classified information, testimonies, terrorist accounts on the media, memoires, books 
by counter-terrorism experts, journalistic books on individual terrorist life, and ethnographic 
studies which include the terrorist accounts of the events. Nevertheless, given the fact that 
terrorism is subjective and politicised, it should be kept in mind that reports by governments and 
agencies that deal with terrorism may have a political agenda. Their vision on terrorism might be 
different from ours. We have to be aware of the fact that there is a political agenda behind it. That 
has of course an impact on the usability of these kinds of reports. In other words, these public 
documents reflect how each government wishes to frame, or project, its counter-terrorist agenda 
to the public. 
Another method of data collection and interpretation in this research was the researcher’s 
career as a police professional. The researcher’s practical, real-world experience in counter-
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terrorism and professional observations within the scope of his appointment in Turkish National 
Police (TNP) Intelligence Department provided knowledge for this thesis. This duty provided the 
researcher with the opportunity of first-hand view of TNP’s counter-terrorism policing activities 
and strategies. In that capacity, and within the parlance of qualitative methodology, the author was 
an “observant participant.” Observant participation has limitations. According to Ozguler (2008), 
first, a police professional is surrounded by bureaucratic boundaries which confine his/her role as 
a researcher whose interest focuses on a wide range of organizational knowledge. Second, a police 
professional is entirely enmeshed in his/her career (Ozguler, 2008). While such involvement has 
the advantage of offering a first-hand view of incidents, “enmeshment socializes a police 
professional to fit the mold cast by police organizational culture" (Ozguler, 2008, p. 58). A 
contradiction or clash between the role of an observant participant and the worldview of a police 
professional can make things difficult. In this case, an observant participant and police professional 
must consciously learn to distinguish his/her perspectives as an observant participant from those 
of a police professional (Ozguler, 2008). This conflict between the role of researcher and 
occupational professional has been specifically described in ethnographic literature (Fleisher, 
1998). However, it should be noted, that in this particular case, the participant observer, is both a 
police officer and a trained academic, a role that is rather unique in regard to these types of studies. 
Analyzing the Data 
This thesis will analyze the counter-terrorism activities of the TNP and the RCMP in a 
comparative context. This analysis of the policing of terrorism in Turkey and Canada will be based 
on the three-model typology offered by Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001). Pedahzur and Ranstorp 
(2001) proposed a theoretical model of counter-terrorism in which they elaborated on the 
operational aspects of the War Model and Criminal Justice Model in countering terrorism and 
69 
 
presented a tertiary model named Expanded Criminal Justice Model which aims to mediate 
between the war and criminal justice models in the so-called gray areas. The following paragraphs 
will elaborate on these underlying theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism which shape 
police strategies and responses to terrorism.  
Theoretical Models of Policing for Counter-Terrorism 
There are different theoretical models for combatting terrorism. These existing models which 
are either “soft” or “hard” in their approach and consequences provide us with a way of thinking 
about the underlying philosophies and strategies that provide a rationale for counter-terrorism 
(Greene & Herzog, 2009). These models basically accentuate the differences in approaching the 
problems in terrorism from a military versus a justice system perspective (Greene & Herzog, 
2009). In fact, whether terrorism should be regarded as crime or war has been a widely debated 
issue among scholars. There has been significant discussion on whether terrorism should be 
addressed as a criminal justice issue or a military problem (Rosenfeld, 2004). This debate has also 
had its influence on the concept of counter-terrorism policing. Some scholars argue that terrorism 
is criminal in nature although it is generally characterized as different from ordinary types of crime 
(Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011; Friedmann & Cannon, 2007; Klinger & Heal, 2011). They note 
that all terrorist acts are eventually local, especially in terms of their impacts. They argue that due 
to the involvement of violence in terrorist acts and the violation of laws by the violence involved, 
the overlap between crime and terrorism is obvious (Klinger & Heal, 2011). Terrorists 
predominantly use violence to achieve their goals and the violence employed by terrorists 
constitutes a violation of physical integrity and rights to live of individuals which is also prohibited 
by criminal law. Therefore, they argue that terrorism should be perceived as a form of criminal act 
and propose a response using the traditional law enforcement system (Perliger, 2012). On the other 
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hand, there are also perspectives claiming that counter-terrorism is not just a simple law 
enforcement matter (Deflem, 2010). According to these perspectives, terrorism is not simply a 
form of crime but rather an act of war that challenges political systems or the sovereignty of nation 
states, suggesting the use of military means (Perliger, 2012).  
In regards to discussion on whether terrorism can be considered as a type of crime or war, 
scholars have different views on the subject. Vila and Savage (2011) argue that the war on terror, 
like wars on crime and drugs, is likely to fail because the war metaphor is not compatible with 
human behaviour and human nature and cruelly deficient. Black (2004) argues that terrorism is 
not absolute warfare because it is unilateral and covert rather than bilateral and overt, and it targets 
ordinary civilians rather than military installations or personnel. Instead, Black (2004) sees 
terrorism as a form of quasi-warfare. Rosenfeld (2004), at this point, argues that a more precise 
term which can be employed instead of quasi-warfare can be “criminal warfare”. He mentions 
two types of violence (moralistic and predatory violence) which terrorism employs, and notes that 
“terrorism is the nexus of warlike aims and criminal (i.e. predatory) means” (Rosenfeld, 2004, p. 
22). He points out this situation as the reason for ramifications and conflict over whether terrorism 
should be regarded as a criminal justice or military problem, as crime or war, because it is both 
(Rosenfeld, 2004).  
Jaggar (2005, p. 209) argues that “Paradigmatically, war is open armed conflict between the 
official military forces of recognized states or (in the case of civil war) between government forces 
and those who wish to seize state power”. By suggesting that terrorism is a tactic which may or 
may not be used in wartime and may also be used outside situations of declared war (Jaggar, 2005), 
she makes a clear distinction between war and terrorism. At this point, Vila and Savage (2011, p. 
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67) who argue that terrorism is a tactic, suggest that “one does not war against tactics-one counters 
them”. 
After 9/11, there has been considerable debate regarding whether terrorism is a crime or not, 
especially in the US and other Western countries. This debate was both influenced by and impacted 
country responses to terrorism. Post 9/11 American approaches to counter-terrorism that widely 
employ military for responding to terrorism, American use of military tribunals to charge foreign 
terrorist suspects have been intensely discussed by academicians and policy makers in West 
(Roach, 2012a). This is also becoming a growing issue in Canada with the passing of Bill C-51. 
Although Canadians have instinctively seen terrorism as a crime, Bill C-51 provokes growing 
debates among Canadian scholars and policy makers on whether terrorism should be dealt with as 
any other criminal offense or by using military and intelligence methods (Roach, 2012a).  
Based on this discussion, three models of policing for counter-terrorism emerged, the War, 
Criminal Justice and Widened Criminal Justice Models. These models define and shape police 
strategies, actions and responses regarding counter-terrorism and “are rooted in considerations of 
the police role in a democratic society, the rule of law, and the need for extraordinary measures 
that may be necessary to effectively address terrorism” (Greene & Herzog, 2009, p. 145). The 
following further explicates these three underlying models for counter-terrorism policing.  
The war model. The War Model defines terrorism as an act of war that challenges political 
systems or the sovereignty of nation states. This model suggests that terrorism must be fought 
aggressively by using military forces and civilian intelligence agencies (Perliger et al., 2009). 
Advocates of the war model argue that counter-terrorism is not just a simple law enforcement 
matter. They claim that “we are at war, our enemies in this war are not common criminals, and 
therefore we should fight them using military and intelligence methods” (Kris, 2011, pp. 5-6). 
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What is primarily aimed with the use of this model in counter-terrorism activities is the 
apprehension of terrorists and the total elimination of terrorism (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). 
According to Dunlap (1999) the adoption of the war model brings together an increasing "police-
ization" of the military which means armed forces performing tasks that are essentially law 
enforcement in nature. Longstanding British military presence in Northern Ireland, and the Israeli 
military and police presence in the Palestinian territories demonstrate the War Model in operation 
(Greene & Herzog, 2009).   
Critics of the War Model argue that this approach infringes on the basic liberal-democratic 
principles and will lead the country significantly away from acceptable democratic standards 
(Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). They also argue that militarized strategies for counter-terrorism can 
be very efficient in the targeting and elimination of terrorists; however, military action does not 
address the underlying causes of terrorism and does not provide proactive means to address 
terrorism (Lieberman, 2009). Developments in Afghanistan and Iraq after US intervention in the 
name of counter-terrorism, and continuing attacks and conflicts in those countries and elsewhere, 
are indicative of the ineffectiveness of a ‘war on terror’ paradigm. Consequently, the primary 
challenge in applying the War Model is the need to develop ways of applying counter-terrorist 
means successfully, while at the same time abstaining from damaging civil and human rights 
(Greene & Herzog, 2009).  
The criminal justice model. Proponents of the Criminal Justice Model argue that terrorism 
is a form of crime and a violation of existing national and international criminal laws. According 
to this view, terrorism is geopolitical, but it is also a crime in the jurisdictions in which it occurs 
(Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011). Based on this perspective, terrorism should be dealt with as any 
other criminal offense by using criminal justice and law enforcement measures. In this model of 
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response to terrorism, it is the police who are primarily responsible for countering terrorism and 
exercising the state’s monopoly on the use of violence. Greene and Herzog (2009, p. 147) state 
that “this perspective does not attribute relevance to the motive behind the violent act or to 
instrumental objectives, but to the act itself”.  
 In the Criminal Justice Model, protection of democratic principles is a fundamental 
assumption in the fight against terrorism, even at the expense of a reduced effectiveness of counter-
terrorist measures (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). Proponents of the Criminal Justice Model argue 
that the distinction between terrorism and ordinary types of crime can eventually encourage 
overreliance on punitive and harsh measures in counter-terrorism (Vila & Savage, 2011). Over-
exaggeration of the terrorist threat and a state of emergency trigger the application of extraordinary 
counter-terrorism measures and policies which are generally strict, coercive and intimidating. 
According to this view, separation of terrorism and crime can also weaken efforts of investigation 
and prevention, as well as the effectiveness of government responses (Friedmann & Cannon, 
2007). Therefore, according to the advocates of this model, the criminal nature of terrorism should 
be addressed for the development of effective counter-terrorism strategies legislated into policy of 
police practices. 
The widened criminal justice model. The growing strength, complexity, and persistence 
of terrorist attacks in the democratic countries have resulted in the amalgamation of components 
from the War and Criminal Justice Models (Greene & Herzog, 2009). Particularly, during times 
of an impending threat or crisis, the limits of the Criminal Justice Model tend to be expanded by 
policy makers in liberal democratic states (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). This elasticity of the 
Criminal Justice Model brings together the encroachment of the military into the jurisdiction of 
police authority and vice versa (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). In this case, the police adapt to use 
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the means to counter-terrorism which normally deviate from traditional law enforcement practices. 
As a result, “because of these aberrations of the ‘criminal justice’ model, liberal democracies 
attempting to exercise counter-terrorist strategies will tend to deviate from the ‘rule of law’ and 
democratic standards” (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001, p. 4). The Expanded Criminal Justice Model 
has emerged due to the need for the clarification of the boundaries between the War and Criminal 
Justice Models.  
According to Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001), the Expanded Criminal Justice Model 
acknowledges the fact that the war against terror may often stray from liberal standards and employ 
means not necessarily accepted as principles of criminal law enforcement, but at the same time 
still significantly differs from the rules of war and customary military methods. In this model, 
terrorism is seen as an exceptional phenomenon which is not necessarily an act of war but also not 
defined as a malicious criminal act. As the ‘expanded criminal justice’ model regards terrorism as 
an exceptional phenomenon, despite the desire to adhere as much as possible to the ‘rule of law’, 
legal boundaries are expanded in order to facilitate a more effective response to terrorism while 
partially abandoning certain liberal principles and in general abusing freedom of expression and 
action (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). After all, as opposed to the ‘war’ model, the tools employed 
within the framework of the Widened Criminal Justice Model are not enough to completely violate 
the democratic boundaries. 
Within the context of the Widened Criminal Justice Model, the main bodies which are tasked 
with responding to terrorism are the police, intelligence services and special anti-terrorism units. 
Policing responses to terrorism within the scope of this model are; creating specialized anti-
terrorism and intelligence units, preventive arrests, surveillance and intelligence gathering, 
incorporating terrorism issues into police training, expanding the use of protection devices and 
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technology designated to confront exceptional violence, increasing cooperation between police 
and intelligence bodies, and recruiting personnel with appropriate skills from the military (Greene 
& Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). The ultimate aim of the counter-terrorism activities 
executed within the scope of this model is to bring the terrorism suspects in front of the justice for 
trial. 
Summary 
In this thesis, the nature of counter-terrorism policing activities carried out by the Turkish 
National Police (TNP) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) will be compared and 
contrasted by using a qualitative comparative (multiple) case study approach based on written 
document analysis. This analysis will utilize the three-model typology offered by Pedahzur and 
Ranstorp (2001) regarding the theoretical models of counter-terrorism. This case study’s units of 
analysis are the Turkish and Canadian national police organizations. By comparatively and 
critically examining the cases at hand, this research will attempt to further our knowledge 
regarding the strategies and objectives which international police agencies pursue in preventing 
and responding to terrorism.  
The balance of this thesis attempts to compare the counter-terrorism measures and 
strategies of the TNP and RCMP. In the next chapter, main findings of the comparative analysis 









Comparative Analysis of Turkish and Canadian Counter-terrorism Policing 
Introduction 
Current structures and functions of the police organizations are connected to the historic 
development of the police as agents of social control, and in some countries, more closely tied to 
issues of national security (Greene & Herzog, 2009). Along with the change in the roles and 
functions of the police over time, organizational structures of policing have also been challenged. 
There has been a strengthening or weakening of police culture and the acceptance of the police by 
the larger community is consistently being tested (Greene & Herzog, 2009). According to Greene 
and Herzog (2009), in democracies, this continuous “testing” of the borders of social control is 
perhaps inevitable, due to inherent tensions between social control and individual liberties.  
There have been different trends and reforms in policing throughout history such as the 
introduction of community-oriented, problem-oriented and intelligence-led policing models. 
According to Greene and Herzog (2009) these changes in policing have generally been externally 
motivated and internally resisted. Police organizations have often been slow to change like other 
bureaucracies. Changes in organizational structures, cultures, and strategies of the police 
organizations are now being further encouraged by increasing environmental pressures to address 
terrorism as well as crime. Recognizing that all terrorism is local, at least in terms of impact and 
consequence, police throughout the world are more adapted to civic concern about terrorism 
(Bayley & Weisburd, 2009; Deflem, 2010; Forst et al., 2011; Friedmann & Cannon, 2007; Greene 
& Herzog, 2009). Nevertheless, despite the attempts of the police to address terrorism by seeking 
to link crime responses (the processes, structures, networks, and analytics associated with crime 
77 
 
prevention and detection), policing terrorism is different than policing crime, although the two 
occasionally overlap (Greene & Herzog, 2009). 
This chapter examines how Turkish and Canadian police organizations focus on matters of 
terrorism. This examination is directed by the theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism 
which constitute the underlying philosophical basis for law enforcement’s terrorism response. The 
three-model typology proposed by Pedahzur and Ranstorp (2001) in regards to counter-terrorism 
strategies employed by liberal democracies will constitute the main theoretical framework the 
current analysis draws on.  The data informing this analysis is based on textual and event analysis 
of a number of documents connected to the two police organizations. By analyzing the 
institutional, organizational and operational contours of counter-terrorism policing in Turkey and 
Canada, this chapter will seek to explore the evolving role of each respective police system and 
how each focuses on matters of domestic and global terrorism.  
Institutional Level of Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the historical experience with terrorism and the historical 
development of each country’s policing structures have shaped the police response to terrorism in 
each country. Turkey has experienced concerns with terrorist activities and national security issues 
from its inception in 1923 to the present. On the other hand, Canada, has been relatively unaffected 
by domestic and international acts of terrorism until very recently. Policing in Canada has not 
confronted a constant existential-strategic threat which Turkey has faced, that is, ethno-
nationalist/separatist terrorism threat against the ongoing integrity and sovereignty of the Turkish 
state. Since its inception, the Canadian public has generally experienced a benevolent environment 
with terrorist activities being limited to being aimed at the Canadian government. This situation 
had its own impact on the development of Canadian counter-terrorism policing.  
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In fighting with ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism originating from PKK terrorist 
organization, Turkey employed the military as the primary instrument in countering terrorism. 
That is, Turkey evidently adopted a war model in combatting terrorism. Turkish armed forces 
deployed about 145.000 troops in the southeastern region of Turkey in the early 1990s at the time 
when the conflict was at its most intense period (Ekici, Ozkan, & Demir, 2007). The military forces 
took over the decision-making role and engaged in conducting counter-terrorism operations. 
During the fight against PKK terrorism, in many instances the police, although legally not required, 
became subordinate to the military and the police also made use of similar tactics as of the military 
(Ekici & Erdem, 2009). The police have been under the total control of the state and responsive to 
the state identified problems (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The police agencies adopted the idea that 
the fight against terrorism had to rely on weapons, military tactics, and classic policing methods 
and their response, especially in the early stages of the threat, was more reactive in nature rather 
than proactive (Ekici & Erdem, 2009; Durna & Hancerli, 2007). The Turkish National Police was 
heavily influenced by the war model adopted by the Turkish state in responding to terrorism.  
In the following years, especially after 2000, along with the changing nature of the threat 
of terrorism in Turkey, the TNP has started to play a more active role in state counter-terrorism 
activities. A paradigm shift in counter-terrorism in Turkey which brought with it the gradual 
abandonment of the war model and the adoption of a criminal justice model instead resulted in an 
increasing engagement of the TNP in counter-terrorism operations and investigations. Particularly, 
starting in 2000, the TNP has passed through a fast self-renovation (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). In 
parallel with the country’s efforts to join the European Union (EU), the TNP has improved the 
quality of its equipment, infrastructure and most importantly its recruitment and training 
procedures (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). All these developments have contributed to the provision 
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of better policing services. Additionally, increasing importance attached to the prevention of 
human rights violations have created a solid understanding of rule of law and respect for civil 
liberties among the TNP members (Durna & Hancerli, 2007). As a result of improving 
professionalism and the success in eliminating terrorist threat proliferating in urban centres, 
Turkish police have extensively been involved in the prevention and detection of terrorist 
activities. At some point, the Turkish National Police officials argue that 85% of overall anti-
terrorist operations conducted in Turkey in the last few years were administered by the TNP 
intelligence and counter-terrorism units (Turkish National Police, 2014).  
A review of the historical experience with terrorism and national security activities in 
Canada indicates that the RCMP had the primary responsibility in both national security 
intelligence gathering and law enforcement until the 1980s (O’Connor, 2006). The evolution of 
the RCMP’s organizational structure reflected an increasing differentiation of the national security 
work and intelligence function from the RCMP’s other criminal investigative work. The Security 
Service of the RCMP was created in order to perform the security intelligence function. This period 
in the history of the RCMP national security activities (1936-1970) may be referred to as a term in 
which an extended version of criminal justice approach was increasingly being adopted by the 
RCMP (O’Connor, 2006). During the October Crisis of 1970, Canada opted to respond to terrorism 
by declaring martial law under the War Measures Act, suspending normal civil liberties, detaining 
individuals without charge and legal counsel, and by extensively using military as the main force 
responding to terrorism. These patterns clearly fit the war model approach in combatting terrorism. 
Violation of civil liberties during and in the immediate aftermath of the October Crisis triggered 
the enactment of a constitutional bill of rights, the Charter, in 1982 and the removal of national 
security intelligence collection from the RCMP and transfer of this duty to the CSIS in 1984 
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(Roach, 2012a). Starting with the Air India bombing in 1985 and afterwards, it can be argued that 
Canadian counter-terrorism has followed a criminal justice approach to terrorism. At this time, 
Canada has had a troubled history in regards to terrorism investigations and prosecutions (Roach, 
2012a). The collapse of the prosecution of the suspected mastermind of the Air India bombing is 
an example of these failed terrorism prosecutions (Roach, 2012a). In this case, the judge ordered 
that a wiretap warrant could not be sustained under the Charter without the disclosure of 
information that would reveal the identity of an informant. Given that the criminal justice model 
in combatting terrorism subordinates the war against terror to rigid liberal constitutional 
boundaries (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001; Perliger, 2012), Canada seems 
to have adopted a rigid criminal justice approach to terrorism. Additionally, an inquiry into Air 
India bombing in 2006 evidenced a lack of cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS before and 
after the bombing which eventually caused deadly results.  
All these events led to subsequent changes in Canadian counter-terrorism policies. 
According to Svendsen (2010, p. 320), especially since 2004 when Canada’s National Security 
Policy was published, Canada has adopted a risk pre-emption approach to terrorism which “helps 
to reduce risk, allowing risks to be dealt with on more of an a priori (deterrence) basis rather than 
more on a post facto (firefighting) basis”. The underlying principle in this approach is that 
intelligence and security agencies should ideally be ahead of the curve, rather than being more 
behind that dynamic, in their efforts against terrorism (Svendsen, 2010). This emphasizes the 
importance of quality intelligence in responding to terrorism. Based on the operational aspects of 
the expanded criminal justice model which entail broadening cooperation between police and 
intelligence bodies and the use of surveillance techniques and gathering intelligence data as the 
nature of response, it can be argued that this model has been successfully adopted by the Canadian 
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state and law enforcement units. Successful disruption of the so-called Toronto 18 terror cell in 
June 2006 as a result of a good cooperation between the RCMP and CSIS may be regarded as a 
clear evidence of this situation.  
In terms of the general development of policing structures, there are differences between 
the two countries. Canada has a decentralized system of policing involving federal, provincial and 
municipal police agencies. On the other hand, policing in Turkey is highly centralized and 
coordinated. This institutional dimension of policing in Turkey may facilitate a coordinated 
response to terrorism by police units. In Canada, where policing is distributed across many 
administrative jurisdictions, coordination mechanisms such as joint task forces or fusion centers 
appear to be the most suitable tools for the coordination of information exchange and police 
response to terrorism. Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) of RCMP, 
which bring together federal, provincial and municipal police and intelligence resources in order 
to collect, share and analyze information about criminal threats to national security and criminal 
extremism/terrorism, are an obvious example of attempts to coordinate counter-terrorism policing 
efforts and to broaden cooperation between police and intelligence bodies.  
The case of INSETs suggests the adoption of the widened criminal justice model by the 
Canadian officials. That is because one of the fundamental operational aspects of this approach is 
that it entails an expanded cooperation between police and civilian intelligence units (Greene & 
Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). The creation and proper functioning of these INSETs 
may contribute to the removal of obstacles to building an effective and coordinated terrorism 
response system which can be induced by the fragmented nature of Canadian policing and the 
relative absence of experience with terrorism. 
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A significant point of discussion within the institutional context is the legislative 
framework in which the police agencies of the two countries rely on while dealing with terrorism. 
Canada has relied on domestic criminal law to address terrorism. In spite of its prior experience 
with terrorism, Canada did not have any specific counter-terrorism legislation prior to 9/11 
(Morag, 2011). In Canada, before 9/11, the Criminal Code had been amended periodically for the 
integration and implementation of UN counter-terrorism instruments (conventions) which had 
been adopted since 1970 (Morag, 2011; Public Safety Canada, 2013). Terrorism was addressed by 
employing the normal processes of investigation, prosecution and conviction under the Criminal 
Code.  
In 18 December 2001, Canada enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). The Act does not 
stand as a self-contained piece of legislation on counter-terrorism and instead amended a number 
of federal statues, including the Criminal Code 1985, the Official Secrets Act 1985, the Canada 
Evidence Act 1985, and the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act 2000 (Conte, 2010). This 
act added a section in the Canadian Criminal Code which defines terrorism and provides a list of 
terrorism offences such as providing or making available property or services for terrorist 
purposes, participating in or contributing to activities of a terrorist group, facilitating terrorist 
activity, harbouring or concealing terrorists and use of explosive or other lethal device. These 
offences are specifically defined as illegal whether or not the terrorist activity is actually carried 
out and these provisions also do not require the accused person to be aware of the specific nature 
of the planned terrorist activity. Morag (2011) argues that this enables the authorities to use the 
law in a preventive fashion in addition to punishment after the fact. The ATA as well provided for 
stricter penalties for terrorism offences and new investigative powers to both the law enforcement 
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and national security agencies such as preventive arrests, investigative hearings, and signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) collection. 
The definition of terrorism in the ATA was inspired by the very broad definition of 
terrorism in the UK’s Terrorism Act, 2000 (Roach, 2012b). Although Canada took a more 
restrained approach than the British legislation, its definition of terrorism remains much broader 
than the definition used in the October Crisis (Roach, 2011). The Canadian definition of terrorism 
which is also employed by the RCMP includes not only violence but also substantial property 
damage that endangers life, health, and safety, and disruption of essential services whether public 
or private. As Morag (2011) argues, broad definitions of terrorism enable the authorities to be 
proactive rather than just reactive and to enjoy broader pre-emptive powers in dealing with 
terrorism plots and pre-attack activities. In the same issue, Deflem (2004, p. 86) argues that the 
definition of terrorism in vague and general terms “becomes a powerful and highly consequential 
basis for police work”.  
Broad definitions of terrorism thus provide the police organizations with a great flexibility 
in addressing issues of terrorism. Roach (2011) states that the anti-terrorism legislation enacted 
after 9/11 generally defined terrorism more broadly to recognize that not only the state but also the 
citizens and even corporations could be victims of terrorism. The broad definition of terrorism that 
Canada utilizes includes references to actions designed to intimidate the public or a segment with 
regard to its security, including its economic security and also actions intended to compel a person 
as well as a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from 
doing any act. Within the framework of this definition, domestic or international organizations 
could be corporations and acts targeting corporations could be acts of terrorism. However, as 
Roach argues (2011), although this very broad definition of terrorism in the ATA recognized the 
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vulnerabilities of modern societies, such as cyber terrorism, it also heightened the risk that anti-
globalization and aboriginal protesters who targeted corporations could be regarded as terrorists.  
Turkey has had a specific counter-terrorism legislation, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act 
3713, since 12 April 1991. The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (1991) provides a definition of 
terrorism and terrorist offender. The Act defines terrorism as a) any kind of criminal act done by 
one or more persons b) belonging to an organization with the aim of changing the characteristics 
of the republic as specified in the constitution, its political, legal, social, secular and economic 
system, c) damaging the indivisible unity of the state with its territory and nation, d) endangering 
the existence of the Turkish State and republic, e) weakening or destroying or seizing the authority 
of the state, f) eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal and external 
security of the state, public order or general health by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, 
intimidation, oppression or threat (The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act, 1991). As is seen, Turkey as 
well employs a very broad definition of terrorism that provides the TNP and other law enforcement 
agencies with a great flexibility in addressing terrorism. It can be inferred from this definition that 
the main target of terrorist activities is figured out as the state itself. The Turkish definition of 
terrorism does not include the neo-liberal provisions reflected in the Canadian definition of 
terrorism such as the targeting of corporations or serious disruption of a private essential service, 
facility or system.  
According to the Act, a person who is a member of an organization that was established to 
achieve the purposes specified in the definition of terrorism and commits crimes in the direction 
of these aims alone or together with the others is considered a terrorist offender. Additionally, a 
person who is a member of these organizations is considered a terrorist offender even if he/she did 
not commit any planned terrorist activity. That means, the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (1991), 
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unlike the Canadian legislation, criminalizes membership in a terrorist group. Also, according to 
the Act, a person who is not a member of any terrorist group but commits crimes on behalf of a 
terrorist group is also legally treated as a terrorist offender. The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act 
provides a list of terrorism offences under the Turkish Criminal Code as well as a list of crimes 
regarded as terrorism offences if committed in association with a terrorist organization. The Act 
as well anticipates increases for the penalties to be imposed for these crimes under the Criminal 
Code. The Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act, unlike the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act6, criminalizes the 
advocacy, glorification and the encouragement of terrorism. According to the provisions of the 
Act, a person who makes the propaganda of a terrorist organization by advocating, glorifying or 
encouraging its violent acts is liable to 1 to 5 years imprisonment (The Turkish Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1991).  
Organizational and Operational Levels of Analysis 
An organizational level analysis of policing in Turkey and Canada shows that both the TNP 
and the RCMP have created specialized units in order to address terrorism and intelligence issues. 
From this aspect, it can be argued that the expanded criminal justice model rather than a sole 
application of the criminal justice approach is enforced by the two police organizations (Greene & 
Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). In both Turkey and Canada, forces responding to 
terrorism are primarily police services, however, the responsibility of dealing with terrorism 
prevention and investigation is imposed on special branches and units inside the police 
organizations. Although both Turkey and Canada legally treat terrorism as a kind of criminal act, 
the police units dealing with terrorism issues are not the same units dealing with ordinary criminal 
offences. In Turkey, the security role of the police is highly developed with considerable 
6 The Anti -Terrorism Act 2015, publicly known as the Bill C-51, which passed the Senate on June 9, 2015 
creates a new speech-related criminal offence of “promoting” or “advocating” terrorism. 
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specialization. Inside the TNP, there are specialized units dealing with the prevention, 
investigation and suppression of terrorism such as the Intelligence Department, Counter-terrorism 
Department and the Special Operations Department. The roles and functions of these specialized 
units in counter-terrorism were examined in detail in Chapter 3. 
Within the context of the RCMP, the National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) 
program aims to reduce the threat of terrorist criminal activity in Canada and abroad by preventing, 
detecting, investigating, and gathering evidence to support the prosecution of those involved in 
national security-related criminal acts (RCMP, 2015). NSCI was separated from the Criminal 
Intelligence Directorate (CID) of the RCMP on October 1, 2006 and became a standalone program 
which is headed by an Assistant Commissioner. I argue that this is a significant development in 
terms of a paradigm shift in the perception of counter-terrorism by the RCMP. As also stated in 
the report regarding the RCMP actions in response to recommendations stemming from the 
O’Connor Inquiry, this separation is a recognition of the distinct nature of terrorism and terrorism 
investigations (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009).  
The Turkish National Police and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have also created 
specialized police squads to deal with crisis situations, such as a hostage-taking or hijacking and 
for responding to terrorists in case of armed conflict. Greene and Herzog (2009, p. 148) argue that 
“these unique capabilities allow police forces to bridge the existing gap between their established 
abilities in the treatment of civilians and the need for new abilities to address high levels of 
violence with paramilitary tactics”. Special Operations Units (Ozel Harekat Timleri) within the 
TNP and the Emergency Response Teams (ERTs) of the RCMP are the specialized police units 
which are tasked with dealing these kinds of emergencies. According to Greene and Herzog 
(2009), the expanded criminal justice model raises some concerns about the conditions under 
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which these specialized police units are activated and sustained. Although these units are focused 
towards activity in what may be considered “war situations in civilian arenas”, there is also a 
danger that the government may employ them in problematic situations, such as mass order 
disturbances, demonstrations, and crime prevention activities, among others (Greene & Herzog, 
2009). Therefore, police special units and their activities need a strong oversight mechanism. 
Policy makers should be aware that overuse of these units may become problematic and should 
intensify their supervision beyond standard police controls (Perliger et al., 2009).  
Reliable intelligence is an essential tool in the fight against terrorism. Although intelligence 
collection in itself will not stop terrorists, the effectiveness of other operations to thwart terrorist 
acts is contingent upon the ability to gather information about terrorists’ future plans and intentions 
(Perliger et al., 2009). A failure in the intelligence function of the state security agencies can result 
in a number of serious consequences for counter-terrorism. First, insufficient intelligence may 
eventually encourage the terrorist group to escalate its campaign of insurgent violence as they may 
see this as an advantage or window of opportunity being offered to them (Reinares, 1998). 
Secondly, a lack of reliable intelligence may cause the state security services not to be able to make 
the necessary distinctions between terrorists and innocent civilians. This, in turn, may encourage 
repressive and indiscriminate responses by the state which can stir up support for the insurgents, 
at least in sectors of the society already emotionally or ideologically in sympathy with them 
(Reinares, 1998). A reliable intelligence network is therefore indispensable for government 
counter-terrorism campaigns to be effective and to be in line with the protection of human rights 
and civil liberties. An essential point here is of course that intelligence gathering activities are 
strictly fulfilled within the framework of law.   
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Police intelligence gathering has a distinct place among the intelligence efforts of 
governments. Today, in most countries across the world, the police services have their own 
intelligence departments or units. Indeed, police forces have considerable experience in gathering 
intelligence regarding a wide variety of crimes such as drugs, guns, organized crime and street 
gangs (Greene & Herzog, 2009; Perliger et al., 2009). Considering the far reaching human 
intelligence (HUMINT) collection capabilities of police organizations regarding these kinds of 
criminal groups, it can be argued that police intelligence has the ability and experience to gather 
intelligence on terrorist groups. In this respect, Perliger et al. (2009) argue that being in continuous 
interaction with the community, having an ability to build trust and collaborative relationships, 
and having expertise in HUMINT operations among social networks based on primordial ties give 
the police the potential to be an essential tool in counter-terrorism intelligence gathering.  
In Turkey, the intelligence role of the police is highly developed. There is considerably 
more intelligence gathering and local surveillance on matters of terrorism. According to the 
Turkish Police Duties and Powers Act (1985), the Turkish National Police has jurisdiction to 
gather intelligence across the country and cooperates with the other intelligence bodies of the state. 
In Turkey, the police operate in a pre-emptive mode in regard to terrorism. The main goal is to 
maintain effective surveillance of the leaders and active supporters who make up a rather small 
number that can be easily contained by effective enforcement (Haberfeld et al., 2009). With the 
help of pre-emptive operations that are based on quality intelligence, the TNP counter-terrorism 
units mainly aim to stop the groups or networks who have a potential to carry out attacks.  
In gathering intelligence, the Turkish National Police employ a variety of techniques 
including technical and electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, wiretapping, and HUMINT 
operations. Wiretapping and surveillance for intelligence purposes require prior authorization in 
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the form of a judicial warrant (The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). However, in certain 
urgent situations, a senior law enforcement officer (The chief of TNP or the head of TNP 
Intelligence Department) can also authorize the police to start the interception procedure (The 
Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). This written authorization, however, must be brought 
before a court judge within 24 hours, and the judge can authorize the measure or disapprove it 
(The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). In the Turkish system, there are two types of 
interception of private communications. One is for intelligence purposes and is carried out in 
accordance with the rules mentioned above. The second type is for criminal investigation and 
evidence purposes. This type of wiretapping is subject to judicial authorization by a judge or 
prosecutor in exigent circumstances and the length of the measure is different from the one 
executed for intelligence purpose (The Presidency of Telecommunication, 2015). A difference of 
this type of interception is the requirement for the notification of the suspect who is subject to 
electronic surveillance. 
In addition to technical and electronic surveillance, HUMINT is an important component 
of TNP intelligence infrastructure. According to Reinares (1998), except for non-classified data 
and high-technology surveillance, the type of intelligence most likely to be of use is often that 
which is furnished by informers and by agents infiltrated into the terrorists’ own ranks. Despite its 
dangers, the most effective way of infiltration into terrorist groups is human intelligence which 
entails the use of informants or undercover police officers. In regard to the advantage of human 
intelligence, Goktepe and Ercikti (2007, p. 391) argue that “the use of technical intelligence cannot 
provide the benefit of analysis that is possible from human sources, which are able to pick up many 
subtle signs and indications that cannot be accessed through technical sources”. The TNP, taking 
into account the different motivations and ideological orientations of terrorist groups and members, 
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widely employs informants in its intelligence collection activities. On the other hand, using 
undercover officers in order to infiltrate terrorist organizations is not a preferred method for the 
TNP as this kind of operation may run greater personal risks for the officers involved. The use of 
confidential human sources (informants) has greatly contributed to the success of counter-
terrorism operations carried out by the TNP. As is seen from the above mentioned discussion, the 
Turkish National Police employs an expanded criminal justice approach to terrorism, because the 
nature of the response to terrorism includes surveillance techniques and gathering intelligence with 
the intention of arrest and penalization of terrorists (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). The TNP also 
continues to share intelligence obtained in the course of anti-terrorism investigations with domestic 
and foreign law enforcement and security/intelligence agencies. 
In Canada, the intelligence role of the police has been restricted. Before the creation of 
CSIS in 1984, the RCMP’s Security Service was responsible for collecting intelligence on terrorist 
threats, but abuses by the RCMP Security Service in the aftermath of the October Crisis in 1970 
led the Canadian government to conclude that law enforcement and security intelligence functions 
needed to be separated (Charters, 2008; Morag, 2011; O’Connor, 2006; Roach, 2012a). As a result, 
security intelligence collection functions were removed from the RCMP and transferred to the 
newly established civilian security service, CSIS. The excessive response of the RCMP Security 
Service to the FLQ’s terrorist campaign which was not constrained by proper ministerial guidance 
and supervision or by sensitivity to the differences between legal political dissent and genuine 
subversion, resulted in a lengthy investigation (Charters, 2008). This was the McDonald 
Commission which was appointed to inquire into certain activities of the RCMP (Charters, 2008).  
The enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001 served to reinvigorate the intelligence 
and counter-terrorism roles of the RCMP (Rudner, 2004). Since terrorism and related activities 
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were defined as crimes, the law enforcement imperatives of the Anti-Terrorism Act led the RCMP 
to promptly improve its intelligence capacity to combat terrorism (Rudner, 2004). In order to fulfill 
its national security protection and counter-terrorism roles and responsibilities, the RCMP moved 
to investigations that are integrated and intelligence-led, focusing on national strategic priorities 
including terrorism (Hanniman, 2007). At this point, the concept of “intelligence-led policing” is 
critical for understanding the role of intelligence in the RCMP’s national security investigations. 
Intelligence-led policing is a new approach to policing which involves the collection and analysis 
of information to produce an intelligence end product designed to inform police decision-making 
at both the tactical and strategic levels (O’Connor, 2006).  The McDonald Commission Report 
envisaged a clear division between the security intelligence function and the law enforcement 
function, however, there is a significant overlap between these functions. According to O’Connor 
(2006) an important element of this overlap was the development by the RCMP of an intelligence-
led policing approach. This approach was adopted by the RCMP in the investigation of various 
types of criminal activity.  
In the national security context, intelligence-led policing has resulted in the RCMP 
engaging in activities very similar to those CSIS engages, despite its being for different eventual 
purposes (O’Connor, 2006). The RCMP collects intelligence for policing purposes such as 
preventing crimes or laying charges, whereas the CSIS collects intelligence for the purpose of 
advising the government about threats to the security of Canada. The reason for which intelligence 
is collected determines the difference between the terms of “criminal intelligence” and the 
“security intelligence”. However, as O’Connor (2006) states, in the national security context, 
distinction between the two may blur in practical application and the same information can be both 
criminal intelligence and security intelligence. Today, the RCMP has an intelligence-gathering 
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role arising out of its crime prevention and criminal apprehension role related to its national 
security mandate.  
In terms of the intelligence gathering function of the RCMP, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2001 authorized and facilitated the use of investigative tools such as electronic surveillance. As in 
Turkey, the use of electronic surveillance has to be approved by a judge to ensure that these powers 
are used appropriately (Hanniman, 2007). However, the Anti-Terrorism Act also made it easier to 
obtain wiretap warrants in terrorism investigations by removing the requirement to satisfy the 
judge that other investigative techniques have been tried and failed or would not be sufficient. 
Moreover, the ATA provisions increased the authorization period for the interception of 
communications to one year, and allowed three years before the targets had to be informed that 
they were the subject of electronic surveillance by the police (Roach, 2011). These changes 
certainly reinforced the intelligence function of the RCMP in its terrorism investigations.  
Alongside the collection of intelligence, dissemination and sharing of the acquired 
intelligence is crucial as well. Integration facilitates cooperation and information sharing, which is 
the life blood of law enforcement (Hanniman, 2007). In Canada, there were several triggers of the 
idea of integrated policing and increased information sharing between security agencies. These 
were the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the inflow of extra money for security after 9/11, the findings of 
the Major Commission of Inquiry into the Air India bombing, and the O’Connor Commission of 
Inquiry on the Maher Arar investigation (Kitchen, 2014). A significant reason underlying both the 
Air India tragedy and the Maher Arar case was the poor cooperation between Canadian security 
agencies, namely, the RCMP and the CSIS. One of the arguments in establishing integrated 
policing mechanisms and improving cooperation between the RCMP and the CSIS was to avoid 
another Air India bombing but also prevent another Maher Arar (Kitchen, 2014). Having 
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recognized the detrimental results of a lack of cooperation between agencies dealing with national 
security issues, Canada does want to engage all stakeholders in the prevention of terrorism through 
the establishment of integrated information sharing and cooperation structures. 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police aims to achieve operational coordination and tactical 
cooperation with CSIS and other federal agencies, other levels of government such as provincial 
and municipal police agencies, and also with counterparts in the US, through the establishment of 
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Integrated National Security Enforcement 
Teams (INSETs) (Rudner, 2004). These multi-agency structures are an important tool for 
broadening cooperation between police and intelligence bodies, coordinating responses to 
terrorism, improving police effectiveness in addressing terrorism and creating a data collection 
and analytic focus to better understand risk and response. Greene and Herzog (2009) argue that 
these type of partnerships also help local agencies which do not have the same capacity to integrate 
information and data from several sources as the national-level or federal agencies.  
At the same time, these structures can also have some disadvantages. In her study on the 
effectiveness and effects of Canada’s INSETs, Kitchen (2014) talks about the general trends 
observed in national security policing in Canada. She argues that the integration and the creation 
of INSETs in Canada encourage a trend of formalization which will ensure that all laws, rules, and 
regulations are followed in national security policing. She suggests that this is, a trend of 
coordination and skill building, and a trend of gathering and sharing more and more data. Kitchen 
(2014) argues that integration may bring together some risks such as the disappearance of 
productive disagreement and other problems associated with excessive data gathering and the 
problems due to a lack of integrated review and complaints mechanism (Kitchen, 2014).  
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In order to expand cooperation, the RCMP and the CSIS signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) in September 2006 (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 
2009). This memorandum delineated the respective mandates of each organization and proposed 
initiatives aimed at providing mutual support. Canada’s National Security Policy of 2004 also 
established an Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) which is responsible for providing 
comprehensive and integrated analyses of potential terrorist threats to Canada for timely 
dissemination to agencies with national security or public safety responsibilities (Rudner, 2004). 
These threat assessments are generated as a result of intelligence coming from across departments 
and agencies and external partners. The RCMP is one of the primary federal government agencies 
comprising the ITAC (Rudner, 2004).  
The literature suggests that there is a lack of cooperation and exchange of intelligence 
between the TNP and the other Turkish law enforcement and intelligence agencies. For example, 
Haberfeld et al. (2009) discuss about the lack of cooperation and the disconnect between the TNP 
and the Turkish Gendarmerie in fighting terrorism. In Turkey, recently established partnerships 
such as the National Intelligence Coordination Board (Milli Istihbarat Koordinasyon Kurulu-
MIKK) and the National Intelligence Coordination Centers (Milli Istihbarat Koordinasyon 
Merkezleri-MIKM) are designed as the primary tools for promoting effective intelligence sharing 
between state security agencies including the TNP (Turkish National Intelligence Organization, 
2015). However, the effectiveness and functionality of these newly established structures are yet 
to be seen. There are questions regarding whether they will be plagued by problems such as the 
withholding of information from each other. Taking into account the insufficiency of the current 
mechanisms of cooperation between the TNP and The Turkish National Intelligence Organization 
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(MIT), success or failure of these newly established mechanisms is critical for the future counter-
terrorism efforts and coordination.  
Based on the preceding comparison, it can be argued that the RCMP embraces an expanded 
criminal justice model rather than a strict criminal justice approach in regard to terrorism. This is 
because there appears to be broadening cooperation between police and intelligence bodies and 
the increased employment of intelligence methods such as technical and electronical surveillance 
as part of the main operational aspects of such a widened criminal justice approach to terrorism 
(Greene & Herzog, 2009; Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001; Perliger, 2012). These measures are at the 
disposal of the RCMP in responding to terrorism.   
An examination of police powers in relation to terrorism investigations is also relevant in 
terms of understanding the differences between Turkish and Canadian approaches to countering 
terrorism. The success of counter-terrorism efforts relies on reducing the number of terrorists that 
are operational at any given time and, especially, reducing the number of skilled operational 
terrorists in circulation (Morag, 2011). This can be achieved through either a policy of eliminating 
terrorists, or the restriction of the freedom of movement of terrorists which can impede the 
planning, organization and execution of terrorist attacks. Morag (2011) states that there are 
basically three ways to restrain a person’s physical and electronic mobility: through physical 
detention in a detention facility, through physical detention at a person’s residence or other 
location, or partial restriction of mobility through banning contact between a suspect and specific 
persons, or banning access to phones and/or the Internet. This form of detention, or partial 
restriction of mobility, can be preventive and designed to disrupt terrorist activities and prevent 
terrorist attacks or it can be a measure of punishment (Morag, 2011).  
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Following 9/11, the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) enacted by the Canadian government 
provided for new police powers including the power of preventive arrests. Preventive arrest powers 
allowed law enforcement officials to arrest a person when there were reasonable grounds to believe 
that a terrorist activity would be carried out and reasonable suspicion that an arrest or imposition 
of conditions was necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity. Canadian 
preventive arrest powers were, however, more restrained compared to British and Australian 
provisions (Roach, 2012b). Preventive arrests in Canada required the pre-approval of both the 
attorney general and, except in exigent circumstances, the judicial pre-approval of a judge (Roach, 
2011). Preventive arrest powers were expired in 2007 as the original legislation had included 
sunset provisions and until that time no preventive arrests had been made under the ATA. 
However, preventive arrest powers were re-enacted with the amendment of the section 83.3 of the 
Criminal Code by the Combating Terrorism Act in 2013. The current anti-terrorism sections of the 
Canadian Criminal Code contain provisions which allow a peace officer to lay an information 
before a provincial court judge if the peace officer: 
(a) believes on reasonable grounds that a terrorist activity will be carried out; and 
(b) suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions 
on a person, or the arrest of a person, is necessary to prevent the carrying out of the 
terrorist activity. 
According to current provisions in the Canadian Criminal Code (1985), a law enforcement 
officer may also arrest a person without a warrant and cause the person to be detained in custody 
in order to bring them before a provincial court judge in case:  
(a) exigent circumstances exist and laying an information is impracticable; and  
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(b) the officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the person in custody 
is necessary to prevent a terrorist activity. 
Preventive arrest powers are subject to criticism by scholars. Ruby and Hasan (2015) argue 
that preventive detention contradicts the Canadian legal tradition of prosecuting and punishing 
crimes which have been committed already, and only after those offences have been proven by the 
prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. That means, a preventive arrest which is based on the 
suspicion that someone may or will commit crime at some point in the future is contrary to the 
legal tradition and is also incompatible with the constitutionally protected right to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty which is described in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
section 7 and section 11 (d) (Ruby & Hasan, 2015).  
Bill C-51, which aims to expand the powers of Canadian security and law enforcement 
agencies such as the CSIS and the RCMP in dealing with terrorism, also introduces some changes 
regarding the preventive arrest powers of the police. The proposed amendments in the Bill C-51 
will provide for new and lower thresholds for preventive arrest and detention (Parliament of 
Canada, 2015). The new measures proposed by the Bill C-51 will allow law enforcement agencies 
to arrest a person in case they suspect that a terrorist act “may be carried out”, instead of the current 
standard of “will be carried out” (Ruby & Hasan, 2015). Bill C-51 also replaces “necessary” for 
“likely” so that s. 83.3(2) of the Criminal Code would now enable a peace officer to lay an 
information or make an arrest without warrant if the officer: 




(b) suspects on reasonable grounds that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions 
on a person, or the arrest of a person, is likely (instead of necessary) to prevent the 
carrying out of the terrorist activity (Ruby & Hasan, 2015). 
  As is seen, both of these changes lead to a significant lowering of the standards for 
preventive arrest/detention measures (Ruby & Hasan, 2015). Preventive/administrative arrests are 
one of the major components of the operational aspects/nature of response in terms of the expanded 
criminal justice model in countering terrorism (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). Preventive arrest 
powers were never used in Canada from 2001 to 2007 when they were expired by the sunset of the 
ATA (Roach, 2011). Re-introduction of these powers through the Combating Terrorism Act in 
2013 and the proposed lowering of the threshold for preventive arrests/detentions by the 
amendments in the Criminal Code by the Bill C-51, suggest that Canada has adopted and 
institutionalized an expanded criminal justice approach to terrorism rather than a model in which 
terrorism is treated in a manner similar to ordinary criminality.  
 In the context of Turkey, the legislation has not provided for preventive arrest powers to 
the police for specific use in terrorism cases. The legislation grants the power of 
preventive/administrative arrest to the law enforcement in certain circumstances, however, there 
is not a specific attribution to offences of terrorism in these cases. The preventive/administrative 
arrest power granted to the Turkish National Police by the No. 2559 Police Duties and Powers Act 
(1985) section 13, is aimed at the arrest of a person who: 
• disturbs the public order by getting excessively drunk and by fighting, quarreling and 
attempting to attack others, 
• illegally enters the country or is subject to a deportation or extradition decision,  
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• is a mentally disordered person, drug or alcohol addict who is legally subject to medical 
treatment, education or correction in an institution, or is a person who may contaminate 
infectious diseases and constitutes a danger for the public health, 
• is a minor subject to detention at a correctional facility or subject to a decision allowing 
him/her to be brought in front of competent authorities, 
• endangers the safety of other people.  
As is seen from the provisions in the legislation, the application of preventive arrests in 
Turkey is very limited. Turkish legislation does not provide for a preventive arrest power which 
allows the police to arrest a person on the suspicion that he/she may or will commit a terrorism 
offence at some point in the future. However, the new provision which has recently been proposed 
by an amendment to the Police Duties and Powers Act in 2015 and which contains the preventive 
arrest of a person who “endangers the safety of other people” is overly broad and vague. It is yet to 
be seen whether this provision may be employed by the police for the preventive arrest of people on 
terrorism charges.  
The Canadian legislation provides the RCMP with a power of investigative hearings. This 
is a mechanism to compel a person to answer questions relating to terrorist activities either in the 
past or the future (Roach, 2011). Investigative hearings expired in 2007 together with the power of 
preventive arrest. However, they were re-enacted by subsequent legislation. In the new legislation, 
on the consent of the Attorney General, a peace officer may apply to a judge in private for an order 
directing individuals with information relevant to an ongoing investigation of a terrorism offence to 
appear before a judge and provide information (O’Connor, 2006). The power of investigative 
hearings raised some debates in Canada. The Supreme Court subsequently upheld its 
constitutionality (Roach, 2012b). The Turkish National Police do not have the power of applying 
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for the establishment of an investigative hearing. In terms of other police powers to investigate 
terrorism, both the TNP and the RCMP make use of judicial arrests, police custody, search and 
seizure powers, and a wide range of surveillance powers.   
One of the most crucial components of the counter-terrorism process is the prevention of 
terrorist activities by addressing the factors that motivate individuals to engage in terrorism-related 
activities and intervening and disrupting the terrorist identity building process and radicalization 
leading to violence. Terrorist organizations need an ideology, domestic and international support, 
money and human resources to keep up their activities. Human capital is probably the most 
important element as terrorist organizations do not have a chance to sustain their activities without 
having the support of adequate manpower. Therefore, terrorist groups attach great importance to 
their recruitment efforts. The law enforcement units dealing with terrorism should be aware of the 
fact that their activities also need to be targeted at depleting the human sources of a terrorist 
organization. Accordingly, security and law enforcement agencies across the world increasingly 
seek to prevent the engagement of individuals in terrorist organizations by addressing reasons for 
radicalization leading to violence and searching the ways for dealing with this phenomena.  
Studies of radicalization investigate the processes through which individuals become 
socialized into engaging in terrorist violence without moral restraints (McAllister & Schmid, 
2013). Sprinzak (1991, p. 59) refers to the study of terrorism as “the study of human 
transformation, of a psycho-political passage in time from normal to extra-normal behaviour”. 
While investigating the reasons for this transformation, some theories of radicalization shift the 
locus of psychological studies away from individual deviance and focus on the ways in which 
external influences transform otherwise normal individuals into potential terrorists (McAllister & 
Schmid, 2013). Thus, some theories of radicalization concentrate on the ways external factors, 
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institutions and structures affect individuals in their decision to participate in terrorist violence 
(Sprinzak, 1991; Moghadam, 2005; Silbner & Bhatt, 2007; European Commission’s Expert Group 
on Violent Radicalization, 2008). The criminal justice system is a crucial domain where 
individuals are most likely to experience the government in their lives. Karstedt and LaFree (2006) 
point out that encounters with criminal justice agents, particularly police, are an essential part of 
the living experience of democracy.  
As one of the primary agents of social control and a fundamental component of the criminal 
justice system, the police are also invariably perceived as the representatives of the state. A strong 
bond of trust between the police and the public not only contributes to people’s sense of security 
and the quality of life but also encourages the development and sustainability of democracy. On 
the other hand, weakening or breaking of the bond of trust between the police and the public results 
in the erosion of democracy along with the public order and the governmental authority (Durna & 
Hancerli, 2007). This causes what Ehud Sprinzak (1991) calls “de-legitimization” which explains 
the movement of individuals, both psychologically and politically, from acceptable political 
activism to terrorism. Perception of the police as adversaries and as an instrument to deliver 
oppressive state policies in the interest of protecting the regime and the state leads to a “crisis of 
confidence” which is the first phase of radicalization process according to Sprinzak’s (1991) theory 
of transformational de-legitimization. De-legitimization of the agents of the regime leads to the 
de-legitimization, demonization and dehumanization of the system, ultimately resulting in political 
violence. Police organizations are, therefore, supposed to engage with individuals and 
communities in order to address potential political violence and to stop and/or reverse the process 
of radicalization leading to violent extremism.  
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The TNP has developed a number of initiatives to recognize and address individuals at risk 
of becoming radicalized to violence and becoming future recruits of terrorist groups. The main 
purpose of these initiatives is to disrupt the activities of terrorist organizations by thwarting the 
flow of potential recruits. A major initiative embraced by the TNP in preventing terrorist 
organizations’ activities is an intervention program called the “Informative and Preventive 
Activities (IPA-Bilgilendirme ve Onleme Faaliyetleri)” (Adana Police Department, 2013). IPA 
can be defined as “a comprehensive approach that intends to prevent terrorist organizations’ 
activities in legal and illegal settings through informative, preventive and operational strategies” 
(Adana Police Department, 2013).  
IPA is a long process which continues through the pre-investigation, investigation, 
operation/arrest, prison and post-prison stages and aims to break up terrorist group sympathizers’ 
and active terrorist organization members’ ties with the extremist and terrorist groups. This process 
is also called the Counter-Terrorism Process (Adana Police Department, 2013). A distinguishing 
feature of the IPA process is that it involves not only potential recruits of terrorist organizations 
(at risk individuals) but also active and convicted terrorist organization members and their families. 
With this feature, the IPA may be entitled not only a counter-radicalization but also a de-
radicalization and disengagement program which aims to achieve a cognitive rejection of non-
democratic means, an increase in confidence in the system, a desire to once more be a part of 
society, – in other words, a change of mind in terrorists and behavioural distancing from the violent 
terrorist modus operandi which means the decrease or the cessation of violent actions (Schmid, 
2013b). IPA is fundamentally an individual-based process, therefore, the TNP is employing an 
Individual Centered Procedural Approach Model in Counter-terrorism (ICPA) (Adana Police 
Department, 2013). ICPA can be defined as an approach which essentially aims to achieve 
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potential and active members’ disengagement from the organizational structure and disrupt 
terrorist activities through individually-tailored intervention programs, such as personal and family 
interviews, social support initiatives, mentoring and social projects (Adana Police Department, 
2013).  
A fundamental component of ICPA approach are interviews that are conducted with at-risk 
individuals (potential recruits), members of terrorist organizations and their families. These 
interviews are executed in all stages from first contact with the terrorist organization up to prison 
and post prison stages and aim to reverse the terrorist identity building process and to reintegrate 
the individual to the society (Adana Police Department, 2013). In these interviews, individuals and 
their families are informed about the activities of terrorist organizations in order to raise their 
awareness about the real face of terrorism. Individuals are also warned about the legal 
consequences of getting involved in terrorist activities. In case individuals give positive feedback 
in these interviews, they are also provided with social support in coordination with other 
institutions and organizations of the government.  
Social opportunities such as vocational courses, educational funding, and dormitory 
opportunities for students etc., are provided as a means by which to reintegrate the ex-members to 
the society. The ICPA process is then a multi-institutional approach which also requires 
collaboration and coordination with other government agencies/institutions and NGOs (Adana 
Police Department, 2013). Another goal within the ICPA is to mitigate the unfavourable thoughts 
towards the state and its agents and to weaken the terrorist propaganda (Adana Police Department, 
2013).  
On the other hand, the IPA approach does not exclude counter-terrorism investigations, 
arrests and operations. The model offers a comprehensive approach and argues that both IPA 
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strategy and counter-terrorism operations should be put into practice based on the necessities and 
security threats (Adana Police Department, 2013). Within the scope of the IPA, individuals who 
do not disengage from terrorist organizations or continue their terrorist activities are subjected to 
legal and administrative sanctions including investigations, operations/arrests, and imprisonment. 
However, the IPA process continues through the investigation, operation/arrest, prison and post-
prison stages in order to disengage individuals from the terrorist activities (Adana Police 
Department, 2013). The ICPA model can be summarized in Figure 1. 
 
Figure-1: The Individual Centered Procedural Approach Model in Counter-terrorism (Adana Police Department, 
2013) 
Adana Police Department is one of the law enforcement agencies which is actively using 
ICPA approach in dealing with terrorism issues. Adana is the fourth largest city of Turkey in terms 
of economic development and population. Adana is also a city in which terrorist organizations 
such as PKK, DHKP/C, MLKP, and religiously motivated terrorist groups are actively operating 
in terms of fundraising, illegal protests and street demonstrations, recruitment, and acts of violence 
(Adana Police Department, 2013). According to the statistics of the Adana Police Department, 
between 2007 and 2012, 1730 interviews in total were conducted within the scope of the 
Informative and Preventive Activities (IPA) (Adana Police Department, 2013). This is the total 
number of interviews conducted for the prevention of leftist, separatist and religiously motivated 
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terrorism. In terms of the results regarding specific terrorist groups, in 2012, 74 families were 
interviewed for the prevention of the activities of leftist terrorist organizations carrying out armed 
actions such as the DHKP/C (Adana Police Department, 2013). Seventy three (98.6%) families 
provided positive feedback and 1 (1.4%) family provided negative feedback regarding interviews 
(Adana Police Department, 2013). Additionally, as a result of the interviews conducted with 24 
newly recruited members of leftist terrorist organizations carrying out armed actions, all of these 
individuals were persuaded to disengage from terrorist activities (Adana Police Department, 2013). 
As a result of interviews aimed at 50 more veteran members of leftist terrorist organizations, 25 of 
them (50%) were observed to have totally abandoned or decreased their activities inside leftist 
terrorist groups (Adana Police Department, 2013). These results are surprising as the members of 
leftist terrorist organizations are known for their very high level of ideological devotion and it is 
very hard for security forces to penetrate into leftist terrorist organizations with traditional policing 
methods due to a high level of confidentiality.  
The results give hope for the prevention of other types of terrorism as well. In a similar 
vein, in 2012, 51 interviews conducted with 24 families and aimed at the prevention of the 
recruitment activities of religiously motivated groups resulted in positive feedback from 19 
families (79%) and negative feedback from 5 families (21%) (Adana Police Department, 2013). 
As a result of these interviews 20 people (42%) were disengaged from religiously motivated 
groups and 28 (58%) individuals were observed to continue their terrorist activities (Adana Police 
Department, 2013). Finally, according to the statistics of the Adana Police Department (2013), 463 
interviews were conducted in 2012 with 375 individuals and their family members for the 
disruption of separatist terrorism. As a result of these personal and family interviews, out of 326 
families who were interviewed, 316 families (97%) provided positive feedback and 10 families 
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(3%) provided negative feedback (Adana Police Department, 2013). Two hundred and twenty six 
(68%) out of 333 target individuals who were interviewed disengaged from the terrorist group, 12 
(4%) of them were observed to have decreased their activities and 95 (28%) of them remained 
active terrorist supporters (Adana Police Department, 2013).  
In summary, through the implementation of the IPA and ICPA approaches in counter-
terrorism supported by a collaboration between different government institutions, the TNP mainly 
aim to prevent terrorist organizations from recruiting and maintaining individual militants. For that 
purpose, the TNP officers communicate and intervene with potential terrorist recruits, active 
terrorist group members and their families with a view for informing and making them aware about 
the real nature of terrorist activities and preventing the disinformation of terrorist groups. What is 
also aimed by these efforts is to ensure the reintegration of the ex-militants and potential terrorist 
supporters to the society by socially supporting them and to subject those who continue their 
activities and commit terrorist crimes to legal and administrative sanctions. Finally, the TNP aim 
to establish a communication channel between the police and the target audience and to mitigate 
anti-state attitudes by trying to solve problems and providing social support to individuals 
vulnerable to terrorist propaganda and their families. As Schmid (2013b) states, strengthening and 
maintaining a strong sense of legitimacy among the public regarding the fairness of the judicial 
and the political system is crucial for the success of counter-radicalization policies. 
One of the four fundamental elements specified in Canada’s Counter-terrorism Strategy, is 
the Prevent element which aims to prevent individuals from participating in terrorism by 
addressing the motivations of individuals who engage in, or have the potential to engage in terrorist 
activities (Public Safety Canada, 2013). That is, the prevention of recruitment attempts by terrorist 
groups as well as the prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism is considered by 
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the Canadian authorities as an indispensable component of the counter-terrorism process. 
Accordingly, Canadian government authorities and police agencies seek to build partnerships with 
individuals and groups in Canadian communities based on the fact that “the means to help prevent 
violent extremism ultimately lie within communities” (Public Safety Canada, 2014, p. 36). 
Canadian authorities have developed a number of initiatives seeking to promote government-
community partnerships for building prevention capacity in counter-terrorism. These initiatives 
are the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security jointly supported by Public Safety Canada and the 
Department of Justice, and the RCMP’s National Security Community Outreach (NSCO) 
programs (Public Safety Canada, 2013). The main objectives of these initiatives are strengthening 
community cohesion and resilience against terrorism and fostering critical thinking about extremist 
messaging. These programs also aim to develop a better understanding of the threats posed by 
radicalization leading to violence and to secure the support of communities in counter-terrorism 
policies and measures (Edwards et al., 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2014). These kinds of 
initiatives also help come up with effective means to intervene during the radicalization to violence 
process (Edwards et al., 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2014).  
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, aware that police agencies cannot effectively address 
the threat of terrorism and radicalization leading to violence through traditional investigation and 
police intervention methods alone, has developed a number of initiatives as part of the Prevent 
element of the Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy (Edwards et al., 2015). The most prominent of 
such initiatives is the National Security Community Outreach (NSCO) program which has been 
active since 2006. National Security Community Outreach is a community engagement program 
which is basically aimed at building trust between the police and the communities. It also aims to 
encourage ongoing dialogue regarding the key issues of concern related to national security by 
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addressing community concerns, identifying mutual goals and practicing open and respectful 
communication (Edwards et al., 2015). In keeping with the philosophy of community policing, 
another purpose of the creation of the RCMP’s NSCO Program is the involvement of the diverse 
ethnic, cultural and religious communities of Canada in the protection of Canada’s national 
security (Hanniman, 2008). The fundamental logic behind the community engagement activities 
of the police organizations is the idea that the counter-terrorism process is a responsibility shared 
by all members of society. Countering terrorism entails gaining the support and confidence of 
society and the involvement of the public in the implementation of counter-terrorism measures and 
policies. Moreover, particularly in regards to radicalization leading to violent extremism, family 
members, peers, religious and community figures are crucial partners of the law enforcement 
agencies in the recognition of and intervention to indicators of radicalization (Public Safety 
Canada, 2014).  
Community engagement activities are one of the core functions of the RCMP’s INSETs. 
Within the scope of the RCMP’s NSCO program, the primary activity of the community-outreach 
coordinators assigned to each INSET includes establishing networks of key contacts within 
communities such as religious leaders, civil-society actors, etc., in order to build ongoing dialogue 
on important matters (Edwards et al., 2015). These issues vary from addressing potential 
extremists radicalizing to violence to identifying and addressing the concerns of minority 
communities. Other tasks of community outreach officers involve representing RCMP at cultural 
and targeted outreach events and acting as points of contact and spokespeople on behalf of the 
RCMP in the wake of major incidents (Edwards et al., 2015).  
In addition to outreach and engagement efforts made within the scope of the NSCO 
program, the RCMP is also currently finalizing the implementation of its Countering Violent 
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Extremism (CVE) program. This program aims to mobilize community resources and local law 
enforcement in order to recognize and address individuals who are at risk of becoming radicalized 
to violence (Public Safety Canada, 2014). RCMP’s new CVE program also seeks to engage 
communities on the topic of radicalization to violence in view of mitigating the home-grown 
terrorist threat through prevention in the pre-criminal space (TSAS, 2014). Canadian officials 
argue that the RCMP’s CVE program is not aimed at specific individuals or communities. They 
argue that it will focus on those who show signs of becoming engaged in violent extremist activity 
and who have been identified by law enforcement based on a number of pre-determined, unbiased 
and objective criteria that are grounded in research, or by the community itself. The CVE process 
will include awareness, education, tools and multi-agency involvement (TSAS, 2014). Disruptive 
actions such as investigation, arrest, prosecution and criminal charges will be enforced in case 
preventive action fails.  
In a comparative context, it can be argued that the TNP’s IPA activities and the initiatives 
developed by the RCMP as part of the Prevent framework have common goals. In addition to 
traditional investigation and police intervention methods in counter-terrorism, both agencies carry 
out prevention-centered counter-terrorism activities such as the engagement by the police of at-
risk individuals and communities and intervention to radicalization leading to violence. However, 
the two organizations differ in some points within the context of the implementation of preventive 
activities. The IPA approach implemented by the TNP continues through the whole counter-
terrorism process including pre-investigation, investigation, arrest, prosecution, prison and post-
prison phases. That is, engagement efforts are pursued in every stage of the counter-terrorism 
process. In addition to individuals who show signs of becoming engaged in violent extremist 
activity, but who have not yet been consolidated into the organizational structure of a terrorist 
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group or progressed to the execution of criminal terrorist activity, active terrorist group members 
who have already been radicalized and may have been subjected to investigation, arrest/detention, 
prosecution or imprisonment are also evaluated as the targets of the TNP’s IPA approach. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the TNP’s IPA program aims at the prevention of radicalization 
leading to violence as well as de-radicalization and disengagement of radicalised individuals and 
suspected or convicted terrorists.  
In fact, as Schmid (2013b) states, there is a lack of conceptual clarity in the emerging 
discourse on de-radicalization and it often appears to be understood as any effort aimed at 
preventing radicalisation from taking place. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force (UN CTITF) Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism that 
lead to Terrorism defines de-radicalisation as “programmes that are generally directed against 
individuals who have become radical with the aim of reintegrating them into society or at least 
dissuading them from violence” (Schmid, 2013b, p. 40). One of the objectives of the TNP’s IPA 
approach is the reintegration of the disengaged and former members of terrorist groups back into 
society. In order to achieve this, various kinds of social support including finding jobs and 
providing education possibilities are provided to de-radicalized and/or disengaged terrorist group 
members (Adana Police Department, 2013).  
The literature has also identified various instruments which are utilized to accomplish de-
radicalization, or more often, disengagement (without de-radicalization) from a terrorist group. 
These tools include but are not limited to the role of go-betweens who can influence the terrorist 
(often from family or peer group), social measures (facilitating economic and social reintegration 
of the repentant terrorist), some form of continued/subsequent monitoring to avoid recidivism, and 
emphasis on family and peers, both as a support group and as a group towards which the repentant 
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has responsibility, as a father, son, husband, friend, etc. (Schmid, 2013b, p. 44). Based on the 
literature, it can be suggested that the measures implemented by the TNP as part of IPA efforts are 
as well designated to ensure de-radicalization and disengagement of the terrorist group 
members/sympathizers or radicalized individuals. Also, the term “radicalization” is not limited to 
jihadi terrorism in the context of the TNP counter-terrorism efforts. The TNP’s counter-
radicalization, de-radicalization and disengagement attempts are implemented based on a broad 
understanding of the concept including not only religious extremism but also the leftist and ethno-
nationalist/separatist extremism leading to violence.  
On the other hand, based on the current programming of the prevention of radicalization 
leading to violence and other Prevent national counter-terrorism initiative, it is clear that the RCMP 
engagement efforts mainly focus on addressing at risk individuals through the collaboration of the 
community before these individuals proceed to the point where disruptive law enforcement action 
is warranted. The scope of the intervention and engagement programs within such a strategy is 
limited to the identification of potential radicals. This is different from the TNP’s IPA approach 
which continues throughout the whole counter-terrorism process and tries to achieve the 
individual’s complete breaking off his/her ties with the terrorist group, reintegrating them into 
society or at least dissuading them from violence.  
The RCMP’s programming does not involve any specific attempt to disengage the 
radicalized individuals or suspected/convicted terrorists from terrorist groups or activity during the 
arrest, prosecution, or prison/post-prison phases and reintegrate them to the society through the 
provision of various kinds of social support or rehabilitation programs. The main focus in the 
RCMP’s initiative is on the intervention and the pre-emption of the risks. In this regard, the 
RCMP’s preventative work is essentially labeled counter-radicalization. This has been described 
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by the UN CTITF as “policies and programmes aimed at addressing some of the conditions that 
may propel some individuals down the path to terrorism… specifically designed to deter 
disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming 
terrorists” (Schmid, 2013b).  
Schmid (2013b) explains such counter-terrorism initiatives to be related to the current 
terrorist threat Western countries are facing. According to Schmid (2013b), the Western world 
including the European countries and recently US increasingly face the threat of homegrown 
jihadist terrorism. This has resulted in a partial shift of focus from de-radicalisation of terrorist 
suspects to preventive work in the local and foreign communities from which the terrorists emerge 
(Schmid, 2013b). Canada has been facing a threat of terrorist violence posed by home-grown 
violent extremists or potential lone-actor terrorists (Public Safety Canada, 2013; Public Safety 
Canada, 2014, Edwards et al., 2015). Accordingly, in parallel with the other Western countries 
facing the threat of homegrown extremism, Canada and the RCMP may have accelerated counter-
radicalization efforts including community engagement, strengthening public resilience to 
extremism, addressing local grievances, and broadening community outreach. As Schmid (2013b) 
states, counter-radicalization efforts do not mainly focus on the terrorists themselves but rather on 
the strengthening and empowering of the community from which they might emerge and which 
might, if neglected, be deemed potentially supportive of them. Unlike the TNP’s IPA and ICPA 
approaches, the RCMP’s NSCO program and the forthcoming CVE program principally focus on 
communities rather than directly on the terrorists themselves. In this sense, they are indirect 
strategies (Schmid, 2013b). 
Within this organizational and operational level of analysis, some focus is warranted in 
terms of police training issues. Training of police officers who will deal with terrorism cases and 
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serve in the counter-terrorism units is an issue worth explaining. Although research shows that it 
is a measure that has an indirect impact on counter-terrorism process, it should be kept in mind 
that effective counter-terrorism strategies require skilled personnel, and this can only be achieved 
through quality training. Extending the training of police officers to include terrorism and 
appropriate responses to the terrorist events is a new form of police work developed within the 
scope of an expanded criminal justice approach to terrorism (Greene & Herzog, 2009). According 
to the expanded criminal justice model, responding to terrorism necessitates the operation of 
specialized units inside police departments that employ personnel skilled in counter-terrorism 
cases. A certain level of expertise and specific knowledge about terrorism and terrorist offences, 
counter-terrorism, the processes for information sharing, terrorism investigations, intelligence and 
national security matters is required for police officers who will serve in these units and investigate 
terrorism. As terrorism is regarded as an exceptional phenomenon which deviates from the 
standard definition of a felonious crime, acts of terrorism require special investigation techniques 
and procedures which may differ from those of ordinary crimes (Pedahzur & Ranstorp, 2001). As 
also stated by the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar (2006), national security and terrorism investigations involve subject 
matter not within the expertise or experience of normal criminal investigators. On the other hand, 
counter-terrorism officers require all of the skills and expertise of criminal investigators, however, 
they should also be trained specifically in terrorism and national security related matters (RCMP 
National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009).  
The Turkish National Police provides training programs for terrorism investigators who 
will serve in the anti-terrorism units and will be involved in its prevention, detection and response. 
All staff who serve in the specialized anti-terrorism units of the TNP receive basic training in 
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counter-terrorism and/or intelligence issues and continuously update their knowledge/expertise 
level through further in-service trainings dedicated to special topics. An intelligence officer who 
serves in the TNP Intelligence Department is required to receive the Basic Intelligence Course and 
depending on his/her expertise, he/she should receive special in-service training in topics such as 
technical intelligence, physical surveillance or electronic surveillance, IT based courses, and other 
kinds of self-development trainings. As such, specific courses are organized about different aspects 
of terrorism. The basic purpose of these trainings is to ensure professionalism and efficiency in 
counter-terrorism policing. Deflem’s (2004) bureaucratization theory of policing argues that police 
organizations achieve a high degree of institutional autonomy to determine the means and 
objectives of their counter-terrorism activities on the basis of professional expertise and 
knowledge. 
Another aspect of the effectiveness in counter-terrorism policing is related to the practices 
and arrangements of international cooperation among police of different nations. Accordingly, the 
TNP conduct international law enforcement training programs with a view of strengthening the 
capacity of other countries to confront terrorism-related activities (Turkish National Police 
Training Department, 2011). The basic aim of these capacity building programs is to help reduce 
the overall terrorist threat by increasing the counter-terrorism abilities of partner states through the 
provision of required training and sharing of experience. In this context, the TNP provide the 
specialized anti-terrorism units of foreign states’ police institutions with courses including but not 
limited to: 
• Homeland Security Intelligence,  
• Counter-terrorism Intelligence,  
• Basic Training of Special Police Forces,  
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• Hostage Negotiation Training,  
• Basic Counter-terrorism Training,  
• Digital Evidence Collection on Counter-terrorism,  
• Prevention of Radicalization, and  
• Investigation of Terrorist Crimes (Turkish National Police Training Department, 2011).  
From the RCMP viewpoint, especially after the case of Maher Arar, the trainings and 
courses relating to national security investigations have been reviewed and redesigned (RCMP 
National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). National security investigators within the RCMP 
are trained based on the specific needs of these investigations. The main areas in these trainings 
include Anti-Terrorism Act, information sharing with domestic and foreign partner agencies and 
within the RCMP, policy and procedure, countering terrorist financing, cultural diversity and 
awareness, privacy and human rights issues, and National Security criminal investigative 
techniques (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). Training programs such as 
the National Security Criminal Investigators Course, Cultural Awareness Orientation Workshop, 
Tactical Use of the Internet Workshop and Terrorist Financing Investigator’s Course are organized 
in order to ensure the proper training of national security investigators in the particular features of 
such investigations (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009).  
In addition to the training programs aimed at counter-terrorism investigators serving in the 
NSCI, the RCMP also operates a “Counter-terrorism Information Officer” initiative (RCMP, 
2015). This aims to provide frontline police officers and other first responders with terrorism 
awareness training on key indicators of terrorist activities, techniques and practices in order to help 
identify terrorist threats at the earliest stage possible (Public Safety Canada, 2013). With the help 
of knowledge acquired through this training initiative, Counter Terrorism Information Officers are 
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able to inform and educate others within their workplace, thereby enhancing awareness and 
operational preparedness relating to terrorism (RCMP, 2015). In the context of Turkey, it is 
striking that although the terrorist threat level is distinctly higher than Canada, the TNP does not 
have a program like the RCMP’s Counter-terrorism Information Officer initiative which provides 
frontline patrol officers with a basic terrorism awareness training. As Haberfeld et al. (2009) state, 
patrol officers in the TNP do not receive specialized training in the area of counter-terrorism and 
are generally assumed that “they know enough” based on the long history of police efforts against 
the PKK. However, Haberfeld et al. (2009) argue that based on their conversations with patrol 
officers in Istanbul, it was not apparent that they know what they are dealing with, not from the 
perspective of intelligence gathering, surveillance, or any other relevant aspect of policing the 
threat. 
In terms of international police training cooperation and capacity building efforts in 
countering terrorism, Canada is attempting to take action around the world. Within the scope of 
the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development's (DFATD) Counter-Terrorism 
Capacity Building Program (CTCBP), Canada and the RCMP aim to help partner countries, 
through the provision of training, funding, equipment and technical and legal assistance, to prevent 
and respond to terrorism-related activities (Public Safety Canada, 2014). RCMP projects funded 
by the CTCBP cover topics ranging from leadership development, surveillance, interview 
techniques, basic investigation techniques, money laundering, major case management, and 
behavioral observation techniques (Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2014). Canadian officials 
expect that these attempts to improve the capacity of other countries to respond to terrorist 
activities successively will help to reduce the terrorist threat towards Canada, Canadians and 




This chapter outlined the institutional, organizational and operational dimensions of counter-
terrorism policing in Canada and Turkey from a critical and comparative perspective. Guided by 
theoretical models of policing for counter-terrorism that define and structure police strategies and 
on-the-ground actions, this chapter examined similarities and differences between Turkish and 
Canadian counter-terrorism policing. The data was obtained from analysis and synthesis of 
documents and reports on the topic as they relate to the two countries. 
In the next chapter, I summarize the findings of my analysis. I also discuss the findings and 


















Discussion and Conclusion 
Police agencies are a critical component in combating terrorism. Criminology literature 
focusing on the study of terrorism is sparse, and much less has been written about the policing of 
terrorism (Deflem, 2010; Lum et al., 2009; Perliger et al., 2009). This thesis aims to address this 
gap in the literature dealing with terrorism and counter-terrorism.  It puts forth a comparative 
examination of the counter-terrorism strategies and measures of the Turkish and Canadian police 
services, the TNP and the RCMP, based on underlying theoretical models of policing for counter-
terrorism. Through institutional, organizational and operational level of analysis, I have tried to 
examine how each police service focuses on and responds to matters of terrorism. In this chapter, 
I summarize the findings of this study regarding Turkish and Canadian counter-terrorism policing. 
In doing so, I also offer some policy implications for both police organizations. Finally, I offer 
directions for future research in the last part of this chapter.  
Findings of the institutional level of analysis indicate that the historical experience with 
terrorism and the historical development of each country’s policing structures have shaped the 
police response to terrorism in Turkey and Canada. Turkey has experienced terrorist activities and 
national security concerns from its inception in 1923 to the present. On the other hand, although 
Canada has recently witnessed a substantial increase in the domestic and international terrorist 
threat (CSIS, 2015), it has been relatively unaffected by domestic and international acts of 
terrorism (Edwards et al., 2015). Policing in Canada has not confronted a constant existential-
strategic threat which Turkey has faced. Turkey has faced persistent ethno-nationalist/separatist 
terrorism threat against the ongoing integrity and sovereignty of the nation state. These different 




In terms of the general development of policing structures, the analysis shows that there 
are differences between the two countries at the institutional level. Canada has a decentralized 
system of policing involving federal, provincial and municipal police agencies. Policing in Turkey 
is highly centralized and police organizations are linked to a unified command structure, which 
may facilitate a coordinated response to terrorism by the police units. As Greene and Herzog (2009, 
p. 163) argue, TNP’s operating as a national agency “facilitated a deliberate connection with 
centralized intelligence gathering and investigating processes”. In Canada, where the policing is 
distributed across many administrative jurisdictions, coordination mechanisms such as joint task 
forces or fusion centers (such as INSETs and NSESs within the RCMP’s NSCI program) appear 
to be the most suitable tools for the flow and management of information exchange and police 
response to terrorism. In Canada, the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) 
of the RCMP is a good example of cooperation among federal, provincial and municipal police 
and intelligence resources in order to collect, share and analyze information about criminal threats 
to national security and criminal extremism/terrorism. 
As a policy implication, it can be argued that the establishment of structures in Turkey such 
as INSETs may be beneficial for enhancing cooperation between the Turkish police and the units 
of other security agencies such as the Turkish Gendarmerie and the Turkish National Intelligence 
Organization. Although the highly centralized nature of Turkish policing ensures a high level of 
coordination between police departments and units in dealing with terrorism related matters, such 
a coordination mechanism may improve the cooperation and coordination between different 
Turkish government agencies having a counter-terrorism mandate. However, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of such integration mechanisms should be consistently evaluated and necessary steps 
should be taken to ensure that the joint work is not plagued by problems such as an absence of a 
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shared ethic among agencies, limitations on sharing information, dominance of certain agencies, 
and the agencies’ withholding information from each other. 
Another finding of this study is that both the TNP and the RCMP have relied on domestic 
criminal law and the anti-terror legislation of their respective countries in addressing terrorism. 
The legislation in both Turkey and Canada employ a broad definition of terrorism which provide 
law enforcement and security agencies with a broad area to act with matters of terrorism. However, 
the Turkish legal definition of terrorism does not include the neo-liberal provisions reflected in the 
Canadian definition of terrorism such as the targeting of corporations or serious disruption of a 
private essential service, facility or system. There are also differences between the Turkish and the 
Canadian legislation in terms of criminalizing membership in terrorist groups, as well as the 
advocacy, glorification and encouragement of terrorism. These differences in legal provisions 
determine the differences between the RCMP and the TNP on the subject of targeting potential 
terrorists.   
From an organizational perspective, there are also similarities and differences between the 
TNP and the RCMP. Both the TNP and the RCMP have created specialized units in order to 
address terrorism and intelligence issues. Forces responding to terrorism in both countries are 
primarily police services. However, this task is imposed on special branches and units inside the 
police organizations. Although both Turkey and Canada legally treat terrorism as a criminal act, 
the police units dealing with terrorism issues are not the same units dealing with ordinary criminal 
offences. The separation and specialization of the units inside the police departments dealing with 
terrorism and national security issues has an historical background in both Turkey and Canada.  
The intelligence role of the police is highly developed and has historical roots and 
contemporary stems in Turkey. In Canada, on the other hand, the intelligence role of the police 
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has been restricted. In Turkey, there has been considerably more intelligence gathering and local 
surveillance on matters of terrorism and a significant proportion of the criminal and domestic 
security intelligence has been produced by the TNP’s Intelligence Department and its affiliated 
units. On the other hand, the intelligence role of the RCMP in counter-terrorism which was 
weakened by the establishment of the CSIS in 1984, has been revitalized by the enactment of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act in 2001. Since terrorism and related activities were defined as crimes, the law 
enforcement imperatives of the Anti-Terrorism Act led the RCMP to promptly improve its 
intelligence capacity to combat terrorism (Rudner, 2004). The analysis shows that both 
organizations enjoy current intelligence powers including wiretapping, physical and electronic 
surveillance, and the use of HUMINT operations.  
In terms of intelligence sharing and cooperation between security agencies, Canada and the 
RCMP embraced the idea of integrated policing and partnerships in countering-terrorism post 9/11, 
and have attached significant importance since then to the promotion of counter-terrorist 
intelligence sharing between agencies with national security or public safety responsibilities. 
According to Kitchen (2014), the recommendations put forward by two significant commissions 
of inquiry, the Major Commission on the Air India bombings and the O’Connor Commission on 
the Maher Arar investigation, are fundamentally important for the establishment of integrated 
policing structures and information sharing between Canadian security agencies. The INSETs of 
the RCMP and the ITAC demonstrate a recognition of the need for increased integration and 
coordination within the federal government with respects to threats to national security. When 
compared to Canada, counter-terrorism in Turkey has also been occasionally plagued by inter-
agency turf wars, a lack of cooperation in intelligence gathering and sharing between the agencies 
being mandated to pursue national security responsibilities. The effectiveness and functionality of 
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the newly established structures for promoting effective information sharing and inter agency 
cooperation between security forces in Turkey are, yet to be tested over time.  
As a policy implication, it can be argued that some initiatives developed for increasing 
cooperation between the RCMP and the CSIS may be helpful for expanding existing collaboration 
between the TNP and the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT). In this context, joint 
training initiatives may be promoted for providing mutual support consistent with respective 
mandates, and joint workshops may be created allowing employees of each organization to share 
ideas, learn about each other’s mandates, and elaborate ways in which they could work in a more 
cooperative and effective manner (RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, 2009). 
Although the criminal and tactical intelligence gathering capacity of the TNP is highly developed 
and has so far induced successful anti-terror operations, the TNP may highly benefit from the 
strategic and foreign security intelligence gathering capabilities of the MIT. On the other hand, 
MIT may benefit from the broad experience of the TNP in HUMINT operations. A Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU), like the one signed between the CSIS and the RCMP, may be signed 
between the TNP and the MIT which will govern the relationship between the two agencies 
together with the relevant legislative provisions. This memorandum will deal with the exchange 
of information and intelligence and set out guiding principles for the relationship between the two 
organizations.  
Operationally, a finding of this research is that the RCMP enjoy broader investigative 
powers compared to the TNP. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Anti-Terrorism Act 
(ATA) enacted by the Canadian government in 2001 provided the police, including the RCMP, 
with new powers in relation to terrorism investigations. These included a new power of preventive 
arrests and a power of investigative hearings. Although these powers expired in 2007 due to a 
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sunset provision in the ATA, they were nevertheless re-enacted by the legislation. The Anti-
Terrorism Act also provided enhanced electronic surveillance provisions. Recently, Bill C-51 
passed in 2015 amends certain legislation in order to further expand the powers of Canadian 
security agencies including the RCMP. The Turkish anti-terrorism legislation and legislation 
regulating the duties and the powers of the police in Turkey do not provide the Turkish National 
Police with such broad investigative powers in dealing with terrorism compared to the ones 
provided to the RCMP in the wake of 9/11. The TNP make use of a number of investigative powers 
including electronic surveillance, search and arrest powers in terrorism investigations. However, 
members of the TNP do not have a preventive arrest power or a power of investigative hearing in 
investigating or preventing terrorism offences.  
This research has illustrated that the TNP’s IPA activities and the initiatives developed by 
the RCMP as part of the Prevent framework have similar goals. In addition to traditional 
investigation and police intervention methods in counter-terrorism process, both agencies perform 
prevention-centered counter-terrorism activities such as the engagement by the police of at-risk 
individuals and communities and intervention to radicalization leading to violence. However, an 
important finding of this research is that the culture of prevention is more established in the TNP 
compared to the RCMP. The two organizations also differ in some points within the context of the 
implementation of preventive activities. While the TNP’s IPA activities and ICPA model aim at 
the prevention of radicalization leading to violent extremism as well as de-radicalization and 
disengagement of radicalised individuals and suspected or convicted terrorists, the main focus of 
the RCMP’s NSCO and CVE programs is on the intervention and the pre-emption of risks. In this 
regard, the RCMP’s programming has more of a counter-radicalization nature and does not seem 
124 
 
to have much concern for reintegrating individuals into society or at least dissuading them from 
violence. 
A number of policy implications may be offered with regards to the preventative actions 
of both police services. First, the counter-radicalization and de-radicalization/disengagement 
efforts of the TNP within the context of the IPA approach are comprehensive and the statistical 
data from police departments in Turkey seem promising. However, an in-depth evaluation and 
more empirical data is needed to test whether these programs are actually effective. One should 
always keep in mind that most governments and organizations running such programs are selective 
about the data they consider to make public and hence, the need for critical assessment of such 
data (Schmid, 2013b). The RCMP also should continue its community engagement activities 
through its NSCO program. However, these community outreach efforts would benefit from 
systematic evaluations in order to demonstrate operational success. Edwards et al. (2015) suggest 
that the RCMP community outreach initiatives lack a clear overall strategy that permits a baseline 
assessment of activities.  Therefore, a coherent national strategy offered by the RCMP 
Headquarters, closer coordination between the engagement teams and a formal evaluation 
framework for engagement activities are recommended. These recommendations can potentially 
lead to improvements and changes that are informed by evidence based performance rather than 
traditional practices.   
Although the nature of the terrorist threat that Turkey and Canada face differs in some 
points, the RCMP still may benefit from the experience of the Turkish National Police on the 
prevention of terrorism. The RCMP needs to focus its attention on the re-socialization and re-
integration of ex-members and radicalized individuals to routine life as well as the prevention and 
disruption of terror plots through addressing the radicalization leading to violent extremism. 
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Although it may be difficult to export a program because its methods are so country-specific, the 
RCMP still could study the TNP’s de-radicalization/disengagement programs and create its own. 
While hard-line counter-terrorism measures such as covert intelligence gathering, enhanced 
surveillance and expanded police powers seem to be the preferred methods for the RCMP, an 
individually-tailored intervention program may prevent another Martin Couture-Rouleau or 
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau.  
Edwards et al. (2015) talk about “the lack of a ‘mentality’ open to ‘Prevent’ activities” 
among RCMP members (p. xi). Findings of this research confirm this fact. An analysis of the 
counter-terrorism policing activities of the RCMP illustrates that the Prevent activities are not as 
comprehensive as other disruption activities. In fact, an examination of Canada’s official counter-
terrorism strategy as well shows that the programs and activities within the Prevent element are 
not as extensive as the initiatives within Detect, Deny and Respond elements of the strategy. 
Therefore, an institutional change of mind among RCMP members regarding the importance and 
priority of the Prevent activities is necessary. As Edwards et al. (2015) suggest, a perception of 
glory about Prevent activities as much as high-profile arrests and other Deny activities should be 
encouraged. Moreover, additional financial resources and training should be dedicated to Prevent 
initiatives.  
Another recommendation for both police agencies in their prevent activities is to ensure a 
strong sense of legitimacy among the public regarding the fairness of the judicial and the political 
system. These type of programs should not be regarded as targeting specific individuals or 
communities based on their ethnic background or religious faith. 
Another finding of this research is related to the training of counter-terrorism officers 
serving in the TNP and the RCMP. Both police organizations train their counter-terrorism staff 
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with a view for increasing their expertise and specific knowledge about terrorism and terrorist 
offences, counter-terrorism, terrorism investigations, and intelligence and national security 
matters. They also do this not only on local level but on a global scale through trainings and 
capacity-building programs provided to foreign partner states’ law enforcement institutions. An 
important finding is that the RCMP operate a training initiative which is dedicated specifically to 
enhancing frontline police officers’ awareness on key indicators of terrorist activities, and 
techniques and practices in order to help identify terrorist threats at the earliest stage possible. 
However, despite encountering a distinctively higher level of terrorism threat, the TNP do not 
operate a training program which aims at strengthening the awareness of frontline police officers 
on terrorist activities. A training program along those lines of preparing frontline officers may be 
beneficial for the TNP patrol officers particularly in dealing with indicators of suicide terrorism. 
Given the findings stated above, I argue that both Turkey and Canada have adopted an 
extended form of the criminal justice model in combating terrorism. The institutional, 
organizational and operational levels of analysis show that the TNP and the RCMP’s historical 
experience with terrorism and the historical development of each country’s policing structures 
have impacted the counter-terrorism model selected. In Turkey, although those in charge 
frequently elected to counter terror through the war model, particularly in the early stages of the 
separatist terrorism, a democratization process of Turkey has gradually pervaded over the years. 
This, together with an improving professionalism and success in eliminating terrorist threat 
proliferating in urban centres, have resulted in TNP’s extensive engagement in the prevention and 




There are certain milestones in Canadian terrorism and counter-terrorism experience which 
influenced the adoption of various counter-terrorism models. These milestones are the October 
Crisis of 1970, bombing of the Air India Flight 182, 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US and the 
extraordinary rendition and subsequent torture of Syrian-Canadian citizen Maher Arar. Findings 
of this research illustrate that Canada and the RCMP have employed all of the three counter-
terrorism models since the launch of FLQ terrorist campaign until today. However, based on the 
institutional, organizational, and operational analysis of the counter-terrorism measures of the 
RCMP, it can be argued that especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks Canadian authorities tended 
to employ an expanded form of the criminal justice approach in dealing with terrorism. Elements 
of the expanded criminal justice model including preventive/administrative arrests, placing 
limitations on the rights of suspected terrorists, expanding the freedom of action of the security 
forces battling terrorism, broadening the powers of the police and the civilian intelligence agencies, 
regulations facilitating the collection and sharing of intelligence by security forces were 
extensively embraced by the post 9/11 Canadian counter-terrorism.  
The provisions of the Bill C-51, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, encourage and facilitate 
information sharing between Canadian government agencies, expand the powers of Canada’s spy 
agency, lower the threshold for preventive arrests, and allow the Minister of Public Safety to add 
anyone to the no-fly list on mere suspicion that he/she will engage in an act that would threaten 
transportation security or travel by air for the purpose of committing an act of terrorism (Parliament 
of Canada, 2015; Ruby & Hasan, 2015). This suggests that the expanded criminal justice model 
has been institutionalized as the dominant doctrine in the struggle against terrorism. Moreover, 
new powers provided to the CSIS by the Bill C-51 will allow Canada’s spy agency to take any 
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measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada7. This is an overly broad expression. This 
leads us to argue that Canada, at some point, seems to embrace a war model which assumes that 
terrorism is a serious threat that must be fought aggressively with military forces and civilian 
intelligence agencies (Perliger et al., 2009).  
In sum, although both organizations historically responded to terrorism within the 
framework of different approaches, the findings based on an analysis of contemporary counter-
terrorism measures of the TNP and the RCMP emphasize that an extended form of the criminal 
justice model is the preferred approach for both law enforcement organizations today. The 
findings, however, indicate that despite the relatively lower level of terrorist threat Canada faces, 
its security agencies including the RCMP increasingly enjoy stricter counter-terrorism measures 
such as enhanced intelligence, surveillance and broader investigative powers and a higher level of 
integration and coordination in counter-terrorism. I argue that this is what Roach (2011) calls “the 
9/11 effect” on Canadian counter-terrorism. Moreover, findings of this research show that the 
RCMP allocate little space for prevent actions in its counter-terrorism agenda compared to the 
TNP.  
Directions for Future Research 
This research has mainly relied on an analysis of official and non-official documents and 
other secondary data sources. The researcher’s professional observations within the scope of his 
appointment in Turkish National Police (TNP) also provided data for this thesis. However, future 
studies making such comparative analyses of counter-terrorism measures of certain organizations 
should include fieldwork interviews with law-enforcement practitioners. In terms of the data 
7Section 12.1(1) of the proposed Act states, 
If there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security 
of Canada, the Service may take measures, within or outside Canada, to reduce the threat. 
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collection methods used for this study, a limitation can be the lack of field interviews with 
practitioners, particularly on the RCMP side.  
 Future research should address issues relating to post-incidence responses to terrorism 
which were not covered in this thesis. These issues involve emergency assistance at terrorist 
incidents, order maintenance when terrorism occurs, and mitigation of terrorist damage.  
 This thesis has focused on a general comparison of the TNP’s and the RCMP’s response 
to terrorism. Future research may address one specific counter-terrorism policy in a more detailed 
fashion. For example, the nature and the effectiveness of counter-radicalization policies of both 
police agencies may further be discussed in an empirical study using data obtained from interviews 
with practitioners and official statistics. 
 The scope of this thesis is limited to the counter-terrorism policies and strategies of law 
enforcement agencies of Turkey and Canada. Future research should compare and contrast both 
countries’ response to terrorism through making an analysis of the social, economic, military, 
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